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Floor time is a scarce resource in a large legislative body like the U.S. House of Representatives.
This dissertation examines the institutional mechanisms that regulate the allocation of floor time to
different bills, focusing on the implications of majority party control of these mechanisms. The first
chapter illustrates the tradeoffs majority party leaders face in constructing the legislative agenda,
and provides an overview of the subsequent three chapters. The second chapter analyzes the use of
suspension of the rules, a supermajoritarian procedure used to deal with most legislative business in
the modern House. Using data on bills considered under suspension from the 93rd–113th Congresses
(1973–2015), I demonstrate that the distribution of suspension bills systematically favors electorally
vulnerable majority party incumbents, and largely excludes their minority party counterparts. The
next chapter focuses on the more partisan and contentious portion of the legislative agenda, turning
towards the bills that are typically assigned a special rule for consideration by the House Rules
Committee before reaching the floor. I study an unorthodox Rules Committee practice of combining
multiple bills together into one package before sending them to the floor. Using data on all House
bills introduced from the 112th–114th Congresses (2011–2016), I demonstrate that partisan bills
are more likely to be included in these packages. These legislative packages are more likely than
non-packaged bills to be the subject of party unity passage votes on the House floor, but are no more
likely to become law. The final chapter focuses on the role of the House Rules Committee as a
gatekeeper in the legislative process. I consider bills that had been favorably reported by substantive
committees in the House from the 104th–114th Congresses (1995–2017), and develop hypotheses
about patterns of floor consideration for these bills. I find that partisan bills are less likely to be
considered on the floor, but that this general pattern is conditional on characteristics of the bill
sponsor and the majority party.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This dissertation focuses on agenda setting in the U.S. House of Representatives, with a specific
concentration on how majority party leaders balance the diverse demands of individual legislators
with the imperatives of governance and partisan messaging. I primarily address questions about the
collective processes by which members of the House decide which legislative proposals they will
consider. Floor time is a scarce resource in large legislative bodies, and its allocation across different
issues and priorities has important implications for policymaking, deliberation, and representation.
Throughout my dissertation, I argue that the majority party leadership uses its control over the
legislative agenda to navigate a persistent collective action problem. Individual legislators all benefit
electorally when their party has a coherent public brand, but there are often incentives for certain
members to shirk when it comes to the production and passage of partisan legislation. In my work, I
show that electorally vulnerable members of the majority party, who may be reticent to contribute to
the party’s more contentious public goals, are given more opportunities to bring locally-focused or
broadly popular bills to the floor. Additionally, by analyzing pre-floor decisions about whether and
how to bring certain legislative proposals up for consideration, my work provides insight into party
leaders’ attempts to build the internal unity necessary to advance a programmatic policy agenda.
Cumulatively, my dissertation work examines the political and electoral costs associated with the
consideration of partisan bills, and argues that majority party leaders use their control over the
legislative agenda to help defray these costs.
This work is premised largely on an assumption that the consideration of partisan bills in
Congress is costly to members of the majority party because the unity necessary to pass these
proposals without minority party support is not naturally occurring. Holding a majority in either
chamber of Congress requires representation of a diverse array of constituencies—which makes it
inherently difficult to agree on the specifics of national policy. This diversity of constituencies, and
therefore of legislators, exacerbates the collective action problem faced by the party. Accordingly,
leaders are selective in bringing partisan proposals to the floor, and they occasionally engage in
extensive bargaining within their own caucus to build support for these selected bills. Additionally,
leaders devote large portions of the legislative agenda to noncontroversial bipartisan bills—partially to
help cross-pressured majority party members develop a reputation for legislative success independent
of partisanship.
My dissertation seeks to deepen the understanding of interactions between electoral conditions,
the goals of individual legislators, and the form and function of legislative institutions. Through
the analyses presented in each chapter, I demonstrate a number of underappreciated implications
of majority party leadership control over the legislative agenda in the House of Representatives. I
show that, even under a supermajoritarian procedure like suspension of the rules, Speaker control of
recognition allows for the strategic facilitation of majority party electoral goals, as well as the efficient
processing of routine legislation. Furthermore, I investigate the unorthodox legislative procedure of
combining multiple bills together in the House Rules Committee prior to floor consideration, and
argue that this practice allows majority party leaders to pursue partisan messaging goals. Lastly,
I explore the gatekeeping role of the House Rules Committee by focusing on decisions about
whether or not to bring legislation to the floor once it has been favorably reported by a substantive
committee. I demonstrate that partisan bills—those that were the subject of minority party opposition
in committee—are less likely to be given floor consideration than bills that are reported with bipartisan
support.
This introductory chapter proceeds as follows. First, I lay out a general theoretical framework
that ties together the chapters of my dissertation. Then, in the subsequent three sections, I provide
overviews of each chapter, focusing on the specific questions addressed and findings presented
in each. Next, I devote a section to the common themes shared by all three chapters, and draw
connections between them. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of important questions that remain
to be addressed in the context of the work presented throughout the dissertation.
1.1 Constructing the Legislative Agenda: A Theoretical Framework
In some way or another, each chapter of my dissertation is concerned with questions about conditions
under which the legislative agenda is constructed to showcase either partisan disagreement or
bipartisan consensus. Holding constant some underlying level of policy conflict between the platforms
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of the Republican and Democratic parties, the legislative agenda could focus exclusively on areas
of disagreement, exclusively on areas of bipartisan agreement, or could be reflective of some mix
of conflictual and consensual issues. Inherent in this statement is an acknowledgment that the level
of observed partisan conflict in the legislative process is not necessarily a direct reflection of the
latent conflict that exists between the two parties at any given time, but rather a function of strategic
agenda setting choices made by the majority party leadership (Harbridge 2015, Bussing & Treul
2021). In constructing the legislative agenda in the House of Representatives, I argue that leaders
must consider at least the following three factors:
1. The value of drawing stark distinctions between the majority and minority parties
2. The demands of individual members who are seeking to meet their own legislative goals
3. The necessity of accomplishing routine government business (passing appropriations bills,
reauthorizing major federal programs, etc.)
The following sections will discuss each of these considerations in more detail.
1.1.1 The Value of Accentuating Partisan Differences
Parties can gain both policy utility and electoral utility from putting together a legislative agenda
that accentuates their differences with their electoral competitors. Unified majority parties that are
capable of acting as cohesive units are theoretically able to achieve legislative outcomes that move
policy away from the chamber median and towards their own party median. Additionally, parties with
a reputation for legislative success are more likely to be successful electorally (Cox & McCubbins
1993). Assuming that legislative parties are interested in maximizing their seat share (as in (Lebo
et al. 2007)), or at least in gaining or retaining majority status, party leaders must remain attentive to
how the compilation of a partisan voting record would affect the electoral prospects of their party’s
individual members. While a strong party brand theoretically redounds to the electoral benefit of
all members associated with the party, the construction of that brand can be electorally harmful to
certain individual members. Therefore, the value of creating or maintaining a distinctive party brand
through the deployment of a highly partisan legislative agenda is dependent both upon the size of the
party and the homogeneity of the different constituencies represented by the members of that party.
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All else equal, larger majority parties are likely to derive more value from constructing a partisan
legislative agenda than smaller majority parties. This expectation comes from the assumption that
party-line voting will be electorally costly for at least some members of the majority party. If this is
true, and if maintaining majority status is valuable to the party, then smaller parties will be incurring
more risk of losing the majority as they increase the number of party-line votes they take. Not only
would an electoral loss for an individual member be more costly for a smaller party relative to a
larger party, the likelihood that a given member would need to cast a party-line vote in order to
achieve a party policy goal increases as the size of the party decreases. Therefore, all else equal,
highly partisan agendas entail more risk for smaller parties than they do for larger parties.
However, there are good theoretical reasons to believe that “all else” will not always be equal
when comparing a large majority party with a small majority party. For example, if partisanship is
closely tied to certain district characteristics, and if those characteristics only apply to a fixed number
of districts within a country, then the expansion of party representation beyond those districts is likely
to be associated with a decrease in the homogeneity of that party. If this is true, we would expect
larger parties to be less ideologically homogeneous than smaller parties, and therefore comprised
of more members for whom a partisan voting record would be a liability. Of course if a majority
party is so large that its most atypical members1 can defect on important votes without defeating the
party’s position, such parties may still derive considerable value from the construction of a partisan
legislative agenda.2 Party size and homogeneity, then, aside from being possibly endogenous, are
expected to have an interactive effect on the value of a partisan legislative agenda.
1.1.2 Meeting the Legislative Demands of Individual Members
In determining the content of the legislative agenda, the majority party leadership must choose
selectively from some pool of bills. This supply of bills is provided by the members of the House,
whose bill introduction decisions may be relatively independent of the needs of the party or the
chamber as a whole. From this narrow and obvious perspective, decisions about the legislative
agenda are shaped by the demands of individual members who introduce the bills that comprise
1Those representing districts that are the most different from the modal “party district”
2Although they do run the risk that their most atypical members will be held electorally accountable not for
their individual voting records, but for the policies of the party as a whole—which are presumably unpopular
in these members’ districts.
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the potential agenda. Members who are eager to move up within party leadership, those who hold
committee chairs, or those whose districts are particularly aligned with the mainstream of the party
may find it incentive-compatible to introduce bills that further partisan goals. These bills are the
subject of the previous section, and constitute the mechanisms by which policy differences between
the parties may be accentuated.
Clearly though, many of the bills that are potential candidates for floor consideration would not
provoke partisan conflict. These bills may deal with particularistic issues that are of importance
to some specific district, symbolic issues that are important to a specific constituent group, or
noncontroversial issues characterized by either broad bipartisan support or general indifference.
While these bills may not be pressing matters for either the chamber as a whole, or major priorities
for either of the parties, they are often very important to the members who introduce them. Members
clearly believe these bills to be important to their reelection efforts (Dodd & Schraufnagel 2009), and
therefore the demand to bring such bills to the floor is often considerable.
While procedures such as suspension of the rules allow leaders to more efficiently accommodate
these member demands, the suspension agenda—just like the general legislative agenda—is still
finite in nature. Therefore, agenda construction requires majority party leaders to allocate a scarce
resource—floor time—in the face of varying demands from all members of the House. As mentioned
above, some individual member priorities may already be in line with party priorities, meaning that,
by scheduling these bills, leaders can simultaneously accentuate differences between the two parties
and satisfy the legislative demands of certain members. However, as more of these partisan bills are
let onto the agenda, atypical party members incur more electoral risk from their association with the
party, and therefore may increase their demands to have some of their priority (nonpartisan) bills
considered. In deciding how to allocate scarce agenda space to these atypical members, majority
party leaders must weigh the competing demands on the agenda with the expected value of allowing
for the consideration of these bills. The cost involved is simply time,3 and the payoffs depend on how
the passage of the bill would affect the sponsor’s reelection prospects, how valuable the sponsor’s
3Although party leaders may theoretically incur some reputation cost from devoting too much of the agenda
to symbolic or minor legislation. Changes to the House Rules in the 104th Congress to attempt to curb the
consideration of commemorative legislation demonstrate that the leaders of the newly-minted Republican
majority were keenly aware of these costs (Dodd & Schraufnagel 2009).
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reelection is to the maintenance of the majority, and any policy benefit to be gained by the party if
the bill became law.4
1.1.3 Accomplishing Routine Government Business
The third major consideration for majority party leaders in constructing the legislative agenda is the
accomplishment of routine government business. This category of legislation includes appropriations
bills that have to be passed in order to keep the government open, as well as the authorizations
or reauthorizations of major government programs. Not only are many of these bills considered
“must-pass” legislation for operational purposes, they also are tied to the legislative reputation of the
majority party, as the failure to pass them would presumably be indicative of an ineffective party.
House Democrats in the 111th Congress nearly suffered such a reputational hit when it appeared
that, for the first time in 49 years, Congress was going to fail to send a defense authorization bill
to the president for his signature. After dropping a number of controversial provisions, including
the repeal of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, the bill passed both chambers and was signed into
law just two days before the end of the Congress. Similarly, when the Republican majority in the
115th Congress brought a farm bill to the House floor that was narrowly defeated, the party may have
suffered a reputational hit. After the removal of controversial provisions regarding work requirements
for SNAP recipients, the bill was brought back to the floor, passed, and ultimately became law. These
two examples highlight the extent to which routine government business and partisan policy goals
can overlap with one another—although frequently in a way that reduces the chances for successful
passage. Whether they overlap with party goals or not, these legislative priorities always demand
space on the legislative agenda, and party leaders must accomodate them in some way or another.
1.1.3.1 Overlapping Imperatives
Majority party leaders must consider at least three major factors in constructing the legislative
agenda—the value of drawing stark policy distinctions between the two parties, accommodating
4Formally, this payoff could be written: UC = p(R) + pL(P )− t, where UC is the utility of considering a
certain bill, p is the probability that the consideration of that bill will make the difference between the sponsor
winning or losing reelection, R is the value to the majority party of retaining the sponsor’s seat (higher for
smaller majorities), pL is the probability the bill will become law conditional on being brought to the floor in
the House, P is the policy utility to be gained by the majority party if the bill were to become law, and t is the
time spent by the floor considering the bill.
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the legislative demands of individual members, and accomplishing routine government business.
However, as has been alluded to briefly above, these considerations are by no means mutually
exclusive. It may be possible, in some cases, for majority party leaders to simultaneously address
party goals, member priorities, and routine government business in the same bill. It is also possible
to address any two out of these three categories simultaneously. The Water Resources Development
Act, for example, accomplishes routine government business by regularly addressing the nation’s
water infrastructure needs, and also satisfies many members’ goals by authorizing local infrastructure
projects. However, at least in most Congresses, the Water Resources Development Act will not
constitute a major party priority—nor will consideration of the bill be marked by partisan conflict at
either the committee or the floor stage.
It is helpful, then, to think about majority party leaders’ considerations in constructing the
legislative agenda as a set of overlapping circles. The degree of overlap between any of these circles





When the majority party is particularly homogeneous—which in the House would mean that most
of the districts represented by members of that party are relatively similar on some dimension—there
will likely be considerable overlap between the Member Goals and Party Goals circle. Assuming
that the party’s platform is constructed through some collaborative process, it is likely to reflect goals
that most of its members hold in common. If there is not much variety in the types of districts held
by members of the party, this common ground may be fairly large. Additionally, there will be fewer
members who will view closeness to the party as an electoral liability, and therefore we would expect
a higher degree of overlap between the goals of individual party members and the goals of the party
as a whole. Conversely, if a party is particularly heterogeneous, holding together a diverse coalition
of different types of districts, the overlap between the Party Goals circle and Member Goals circle
may be fairly small. This is both because members of this diverse party may not agree on much, and
because members will demand consideration of their own nonpartisan legislative goals in order to set
them apart, in the minds of their constituents, from whatever partisan record their party does compile.
As discussed in the preceding section, legislative areas that have typically been devoted to the
relatively nonpartisan conduct of routine government business can occasionally become partisan
battlegrounds. Aldrich & Rohde (2000), for example, detail how the Republican House majorities
of the mid-1990s somewhat controversially turned to the House Appropriations Committee for the
accomplishment of a number of their major partisan policy goals. Theoretically, overlap between
the Member Goals, Party Goals, and Regular Government circles should be expected to increase
when the majority party is particularly internally cohesive in terms of the policy preferences of its
members.
In order to speak more directly to the overlap between the Party Goals and Regular Government
circles, more clarification of the definition of “party goals” is necessary. An unambitious and
internally divided majority party could publicly state that its goals for a Congress are to pass
appropriations bills and reauthorize major government programs, and this would seem to be reflective
of a perfect overlap of the Party Goals and Regular Government circles in the diagram above.
However, if these publicly stated “party goals” do not evoke any partisan conflict, they do not count
as Party Goals in my scheme. Following my definition, the whole purpose of the segment of the
legislative agenda allocated to party goals is to accentuate to the public the differences in policy
preferences and governing philosophies between the two parties. Therefore, to the extent that the
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Party Goals and Regular Government circles do overlap, their confluence is brought about by the
injection of partisan conflict into routine government business, as highlighted in the examples above
about the NDAA and the 2018 Farm Bill.
Having provided a broad theoretical framework for systematically analyzing questions about
how majority party leaders seek to balance different goals through the construction of the legislative
agenda, I next turn to briefly outlining the substantive chapters of my dissertation.
1.2 Majority Party Strategy and Suspension of the Rules in the House
The first chapter of my dissertation examines the use of suspension of the rules in the House
of Representatives from the 93th–113th Congresses (1973–2015). Suspension of the rules is a
supermajoritarian procedure by which bills can be brought to the House floor and passed with the
support of two-thirds of the members present and voting. Given this elevated threshold for passage,
the procedure is typically used to efficiently process noncontroversial legislation that rarely involves
a partisan component. I argue in this chapter that suspension of the rules is an important mechanism
through which individual legislators can pursue particularistic or locally-oriented legislative goals
that are of special importance to attentive groups in their constituency. However, the procedure is
also used to deal with important reauthorization bills concerning large federal programs, as long this
legislation does not become the subject of partisan disagreement. Referring to the goal typology
outlined above, suspension of the rules often facilitates the pursuit and achievement of both member
goals and regular government goals.
In this chapter, I briefly discuss the historical development of suspension of the rules in the
House, including how it came under the control of the Speaker of the House. At its genesis in 1822,
the motion to suspend the rules was not regulated by the majority party, and any member could move
to suspend the rules for any bill they pleased. This House’s early experience with the procedure
serves as a testament to the strength of centrifugal forces in a large and diverse legislative body, as the
intense demand for individual members to bring their own proposals to the floor frequently bogged
down more important chamber business. Since the early 1880’s, when Speaker Samuel J. Randall
(D-PA) took control over the motion to suspend the rules, the right to acknowledge members seeking
to make such motions has been the sole prerogrative of the House Speaker.
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The importance of majority party leadership control over a supermajoritarian legislative pro-
cedure is a key theme of this chapter. Some form of centralized control over the procedure proved
necessary to keep legislative business on track, but the specific institutional arrangement that was
created gave the House Speaker the power to strategically allocate valuable legislative opportunities
to majority party legislators. However, the supermajoritarian nature of the procedure does not allow
for the complete exclusion of minority party legislators from these opportunities, as the minority
party is given leverage that it would not have under simple majority voting rules. I supplement my
quantitative analyses in this paper with interviews with a House Democratic Leadership staffer from
the mid-2000s who described negotiations with Republican Leadership to come up with an equitable
split of the suspension agenda between majority and minority party legislators. Since the 108th
Congress (2003-2005) this split has remained relatively stable, with majority party sponsored bills
accounting for about 70% of the suspension agenda and minority party sponsored bills accounting
for 30%.
Examining the characteristics of legislators from the majority and minority parties who have
their bills considered under suspension of the rules reveals some interesting patterns. For example,
committee and subcommittee chairs are more likely to have their bills considered under suspension
of the rules than other members, which is partially due to the fact that these members are frequently
the sponsors of important, but noncontroversial, reauthorization bills. Additionally, the expected
number of bills considered under suspension of the rules is increasing in electoral vulnerability for
members of the majority party, while the opposite is true for members of the minority party. This
finding provides suggestive evidence that the majority party leadership uses its control over this
procedure to strategically advantage electorally vulnerable majority party members, while mostly
screening their electorally vulnerable minority party counterparts. This strengthens the central claim
of this chapter, which is that the Speaker’s discretion over the application of suspension of the rules
allows for the exertion of majority party power even in the face of a supermajoritarian threshold for
bill passage.
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1.3 Pre-Floor Bundling in the House Rules Committee
In the second chapter of my dissertation, I turn away from the bipartisan and consensual portion of
the legislative agenda, and towards the more partisan and contentious bills that are typically assigned
a special rule for consideration by the House Rules Committee before reaching the floor. This
chapter focuses on an unorthodox Rules Committee practice of combining multiple bills together
into one package before sending them to the floor. Using data on all House bills introduced from
the 112th-114th Congresses (2011-2016), I systematically examine the dynamics of this developing
practice. I place my work within the context of the literature on other unorthodox legislative practices,
focusing on the similarities and differences between this Rules Committee practice and what has
more traditionally been referred to as omnibus legislating. I argue that combining bills together in
the Rules Committee, right before floor consideration, constitutes an important and underappreciated
exertion of majority party leadership influence over the agenda setting process. Furthermore, I argue
that majority party leaders engage in this practice in order to build cohesive intraparty coalitions, and
to efficiently engage in partisan messaging.
In this chapter, I theorize about the bill-level covariates that should be associated with inclusion
in packages constructed by the Rules Committee, and find that conflictual partisan bills are more
likely than their bipartisan counterparts to be packaged in this way. Turning to the downstream
effects of this practice, I find that packaged bills are significantly more likely to be the subject of a
party unity vote on the House floor, but are no more likely to become law when compared to other
bills that received floor consideration. This constitutes an important difference between this practice
and more traditional omnibus legislating—and suggests that Rules Committee bundling may be more
oriented towards messaging than legislating. Cumulatively the work in this chapter has important
implications for our understanding of intraparty coalition management strategies and the role of
standing committees in an evolving legislative process.
1.4 Gatekeeping in the House Rules Committee
The third and final chapter of my dissertation focuses more generally on the House Rules Committee
and the nature of its role as a gatekeeper in the legislative process. This chapter examines the
interactions beetween majority party leadership, substantive committees, and the Rules Committee
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in the construction of the legislative agenda. Specifically, I consider the subset of legislation that
has been favorably reported by substantive committees, and develop hypotheses about the patterns
of floor consideration for these bills. During the time period I study—the 104th–114th Congresses
(1995-2017)—over a quarter of all committee-reported bills never receive consideration on the floor.
This constitutes an interesting puzzle, as the relatively high degree of majority party ideological
homogeneity during the period of study suggests that committees should be working in concert with
one another as agents of the majority party. The fact that a non-negligible portion of committee-
reported bills are kept from the floor provides an interesting angle from which to study intraparty
agenda-setting processes in a polarized era.
In this chapter, I present descriptive data on the legislative portfolios of the House standing
committees, emphasizing the variation in both volume and content of these agendas across commit-
tees. I also present Congress-level descriptive data on the floor consideration rate for bills that were
favorably reported by committee to get a sense of the gatekeeping activity of the Rules Committee
across time. Two key patterns emerge from these sets of descriptive data. The first suggests that
committees which frequently deal with legislative proposals on which the two parties disagree
have fewer of their reported bills considered on the floor. This pattern, which is more rigorously
explored in multivariate anayses later in the chapter, lends support to the theoretical proposition
that majority party leaders are particularly discerning in asking their members to take floor votes
on contentious partisan proposals. The main Congress-level patterns that emerge from the second
set of descriptive data show that the highest rate of floor consideration for committee-reported bills
comes in Congresses after partisan control of the chamber has changed. This pattern of elevated floor
consideration rates, and therefore decreased Rules Committee gatekeeping activity, after a change in
partisan control points to the fluctuating contextual salience of policy goals for legislative parties.
My main quantitative analyses in this chapter seek to evaluate patterns of floor consideration for
committee-reported bills as a function of Congress, committee, and bill-level characteristics. I argue
that majority party leaders engage in strategically selective agenda setting, exercising discriminating
judgment when deciding which contentious committee-reported legislation to allow to the floor. I find
that bills that are the subject of partisan disagreement in committee are less likely to be considered
on the floor, but that this general pattern is conditional on characteristics of the bill sponsor and the
majority party. I concude this chapter with a theoretical discussion of Rules Committee gatekeeping,
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in which I put forth a number of alternative explanations for the necessity of such a practice even
during an era of seemingly-homogeneous majority parties. This discussion is meant to provide the
beginnings of a theoretical foundation for future work on the topic.
1.5 Constructing the Legislative Agenda: Common Themes
The first chapter of my dissertation deals with suspension of the rules and the ways in which majority
party leaders have accommodated and regulated the member-level demand for the floor consideration
of bipartisan or nonpartisan legislation. In contrast, the second and third chapters both deal with
the House Rules Committee and its role in selectively constructing the more partisan portion of the
legislative agenda. Cumulatively, these three chapters provide a nuanced view of majority party
agenda setting in the post-reform House of Representatives.
I assume that part of the driving-force behind the member-level demand to have bills considered
under suspension of the rules is the desire to cultivate a reputation for effectiveness that is independent
of party. Particularly for members in swing districts, who become increasingly important to the two
parties during eras of narrow partisan majorities, these opportunities may be electorally valuable.
These same members are also likely the most reluctant to support contentious partisan bills that
are brought to the floor in an attempt to sharpen the ideological component of the party brand. My
first chapter shows that majority party leaders can help to create opportunities for these members to
burnish their reputations in their districts. My second and third chapters, on the other hand, attest
to the constraints that are placed on partisan agenda setting by majority party members who are
occasionally hesitant to contribute to the collective production of the party brand. These constraints
can be seen in the pre-floor bundling process, which has the practical effect of reducing the number
of times that majority party members may be asked to cast potentially electorally-risky party line
votes. They can also be seen in the practice of Rules Committee gatekeeping, in which partisan
legislation is consistently more likely to be kept from the floor than less-contentious legislation.
1.6 Conclusion
My dissertation research contributes to a better understanding of the operation of parties in legislatures,
and has implications for the study of polarization, agenda setting, and deliberation in the legislative
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process. The dominant paradigm in the American politics literature holds that the majority party
leadership exercises control over the agenda in Congress, and does so with an eye towards the
maintenance of the party’s public brand (Cox & McCubbins 1993, 2005). However, it is unclear
how party leaders view the connection between legislative actions, such as enacting bills into law,
and the public perception of their party. When party leaders are deciding which bills to bring to the
floor, what factors do they prioritize, other than the unity of their own membership? When do leaders
prioritize partisan messaging by considering ideological proposals with no chance of becoming law,
and when do they prioritize passing bills into law—which often requires bipartisan support?
These important questions cannot be answered by focusing solely on the bills that receive floor
consideration. One of the most substantive contributions of my dissertation work is the inclusion of
rich pre-floor data on a wider universe of bills, which allows me to draw better inferences about party
leadership priorities in agenda setting. For example, the findings in my third chapter demonstrate that
partisan disagreements are avoided more frequently than they are sought out. Additionally, I show
that the ideological diversity within each party constrains party leaders, who must craft a cohesive
policy platform without alienating too many of their own members.
One result of these constraints is that open clashes between the two parties over legislation
on the floor account for a rather small proportion of the entire legislative agenda. Members of
Congress generate massive demands on their chambers to consider a multitude of bills, most of
which are completely untouched by partisan disagreement. The existence of these demands alone, to
say nothing of the fact that party leaders have worked to accommodate them, cannot be adequately
explained by existing theories. My work takes significant steps towards explaining this puzzling
empirical reality.
However, there are a number of questions that are raised and not fully settled by the work
presented here. For example, in relation to my first chapter on suspension of the rules, more
theoretically-grounded work is necessary to explain the stability of this legislative insitution in
equilibrium. If the Speaker truly is using her power over the procedure to selectively screen
electorally-vulnerable minority party members, as my results suggest, what is stopping the minority
party from using its collective leverage under a supermajoritarian voting rule to grind legislative
business to a halt? Perhaps the majority party holds a credible threat of changing the rules on
suspension and making it a simple majoritarian procedure, which would have obvious negative
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implications for the minority party. Given that no partisan legislative majority can expect to be
permanent, both majority and minority parties may have an interest in maintaining suspension of the
rules as a supermajoritarian institution that allows for some minority party access to the agenda. This
is an interesting theoretical proposition, and should be followed up in future work on suspension of
the rules and the endogeneity of legislative institutions.
Additionally, the third chapter of my dissertation, on Rules Committee gatekeeping, raises a
number of questions about minority party influence and majority party priorities. One of the most
prominent findings from this chapter is the strong and persistent negative effect of bill-level pre-floor
partisan disagreement on the likelihood of floor consideration for favorably reported bills. However,
there are obviously partisan legislative proposals that do make it to the floor, and there are important
questions remaining about which bills the majority party decides to forge ahead with in the face
of minority party opposition. While I find that the likelihood of consideration for these partisan
bills is increasing in the homogeneity of the majority party, more specific work needs to be done
on the subset of partisan bills to identify bill-level covariates that are positively associated with bill
advancement. Finally, more focus is needed on the activities of the minority party in these pre-floor
agenda setting situations. Krehbiel et al. (2015, pgs. 434-439) demonstrate formally that minority
party leaders with the ability to engage in “vote-buying” are capable, under certain conditions, of
protecting status quo policies that the majority party median would otherwise prefer to change.5
Given even a modicum of minority party bargaining power, we may expect that there will be some
subset of partisan proposals that the majority party decides are not worth bringing to the floor.
Exploring these interparty interactions, in addition to the intraparty factors that I consider, may be a
fruitful avenue for future research.
5Krehbiel et al. (2015, pg. 425) discuss vote-buying rather broadly, as referring to “logrolls, implicit promises
of support, or a general expectation of good will on future issues in exchange for immediate votes.”
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CHAPTER 2: MAJORITY PARTY STRATEGY AND SUSPENSION OF THE RULES IN
THE HOUSE
2.1 Introduction
Scholars of American politics have long been interested in how institutional features of Congress
affect representation and the allocation of particularistic benefits across congressional districts (Berry
& Fowler 2016, Lazarus 2009, 2010, Lee 2003, Mayhew 1974, Ferejohn 1974). A specific strand
of this literature has focused on the role of congressional parties—and particularly the majority
party—in facilitating the representational, distributive, and electoral goals of their members (Cox
& McCubbins 1993, 2005, Levitt & Synder 1995, Lazarus 2009). One way the majority party
affects members’ pursuit of these goals is through its control over the legislative agenda in the
House of Representatives (Pearson 2015, Hasecke & Mycoff 2007). Members of Congress can
signal their priorities to constituents by introducing legislation, but in order to effectively engage in
credit claiming (Mayhew 1974), some of their bills must actually advance through the legislative
process (Volden & Wiseman 2014). In this chapter, I argue that suspension of the rules constitutes
an important procedure through which representatives can achieve legislative success, particularly
on bills that may be of specific interest to constituent groups in their districts. Using an original
dataset of all House-sponsored measures brought to the floor under suspension of the rules from the
93rd-113th Congresses (1973-2015), I demonstrate that the majority party leadership uses its control
of the suspension agenda to pursue a number of partisan and non-partisan goals.
As is evident from Figure 2.1 below, beginning with the 106th Congress (1999-2001), a majority
of measures that have passed the House in each Congress have done so under suspension of the rules.
What is more, beginning in the 107th Congress (2001-2003), a majority of the laws passed by each
Congress originated from House-sponsored bills passed on suspension. While the Rules Committee
retains an undeniable grip on the floor agenda for controversial partisan legislation, a large majority
of the bills considered and passed by the House in recent Congresses have bypassed that committee.
The role of the Rules Committee in facilitating the business of the House has received much scholarly
attention, while comparatively scant attention has been given to the Speaker’s discretion over which
bills get considered under suspension of the rules (but see Pearson 2015, Moffett 2016, and Rohde
1991, ch. 4). Much of what we know about agenda control in the House, then, is gleaned from
focusing on a procedure that applies to a shrinking minority of the bills that receive consideration on
the floor.



















































































Type Susp. Passed Laws Susp. Passed Measures in House
Note: This figure uses data on all House-sponsored measures considered under suspension of the rules,
collected from the PIPC roll call database (Crespin & Rohde 2019), congress.gov, and the Calendars of the
United States House of Representatives. The dashed line depicts suspension-passed House-sponsored measures
as a percentage of all House-sponsored measures that passed the House per Congress. The solid line depicts
the percentage of all laws per Congress that originate in the House and pass that chamber by suspension.
Of course, one issue with using bills (or laws) as a unit of analysis is the failure to account for
changes in the average length of legislation over time. The recent move towards omnibus legislating
(Hanson 2014, Ornstein et al. 2018) roughly coincides with the increasing use of suspension of the
rules, such that the non-suspension agenda in recent Congresses is comprised of smaller numbers
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of larger and larger bills. The attention paid to this legislation and the Rules Committee is of clear
importance for our understanding of how the majority party uses procedures and institutional design
to move policy in line with partisan preferences. A focus on the increasing prevalence of suspension
of the rules, on the other hand, can provide a more holistic picture of party government and the
distribution of credit claiming opportunities in the House. While literature on negative agenda control
has focused on the strategic suppression of intraparty divisions over legislation (Cox & McCubbins
2005), leaders’ control over the legislative agenda also allows them to grant consideration to bills
on which most members do not have strong preferences. This facet of agenda control, exercised
through the Speaker’s choice of which bills to consider under suspension, directly impacts members’
attempts to get parochial and particularistic legislation passed.
I frame the Speaker’s control over suspension of the rules as a mechanism through which to
selectively grant members access to the legislative agenda. Members demand access to the agenda,
as it can allow them to build up a record of legislative success, and thus provide them valuable
opportunities for credit claiming (Wawro 2000, Mayhew 1974, Box-Steffensmeier & Grant 1999,
Grimmer et al. 2012). In allocating space on the suspension agenda, majority party leaders balance
a number of sometimes-competing concerns, from helping electorally-vulnerable copartisans, to
stimulating the production of committee legislation, to incentivizing party loyalty (Pearson 2015).
The central claim of this chapter is that the Speaker’s discretion over the application of suspension
of the rules allows for the exertion of majority party power even in the face of a supermajoritarian
threshold for bill passage.1 While this heightened threshold necessitates some degree of cooperation
with the minority party, the complete agenda control given to the Speaker allows for partisan
considerations to affect the selection of bills brought up under suspension. Minority party leaders
have sought to use their leverage over the second stage of the process (floor voting) to influence
the first stage (agenda setting), and have succeeded in increasing the minority party share of the
suspension agenda over time. In the face of this increase, I assert that majority party leaders have
been strategic in selecting which minority party members are allowed to bring bills to the floor
under suspension of the rules. To briefly preview one of my findings, I demonstrate that electorally-
1Motions to suspend the rules need the approval of two-thirds of the members present and voting in order to
pass.
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vulnerable majority party incumbents are favored in the allocation of suspension measures, while
electorally-vulnerable minority party incumbents have typically been barred.
This finding shows that, even while relying heavily on a supermajoritarian procedure, majority
party leaders in the House have been adept at facilitating the electoral goals of their members.
However, suspension of the rules is not exclusively used to pad the legislative record of vulnerable
majority party incumbents. Any attempt to understand the use of suspension of the rules in the
post-reform House must also acknowledge the multifaceted nature of the goals that are pursued
through the use of this procedure. Majority party leaders use suspension of the rules to expedite the
passage of noncontroversial but important legislation, to incentivize the production of legislation by
committees, and to further party maintenance goals.
While the suspension procedure is commonly associated with trivial matters such as renaming
post offices (Stevens 2005), Figure 2.2 below demonstrates that it is more frequently used for
substantive legislation. In fact, commemorative bills make up a minority of the suspension agenda in
every Congress during the period I consider.2
2Commemorative bills are idenitifed in a manner similar to that used by Volden & Wiseman (2014). More
details on the identification of commemorative bills can be found in the Appendix A.
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Bill Type Not Commemorative Commemorative
Note: Data compiled by author from the PIPC roll call database (Crespin & Rohde 2019), congress.gov, and
the Calendars of the United States House of Representatives.
This chapter will proceed as follows: First, I will provide a brief history of the development of
the suspension procedure in the House, focusing specifically on why and how this procedure came to
be under the control of the Speaker of the House. I will then lay out my theoretical framework and
hypotheses about majority party leadership decisions regarding the distribution of suspension bills
in the post-reform House. In the next section, I will describe the data I use to test my hypotheses,
and present the results of my empirical tests. I will conclude by discussing my findings and their
relevance for our understanding of procedural decision-making, and its effect on representation, in
the House.
2.2 Speaker’s Control Over Suspension of the Rules
Today, suspension of the rules is the “principal legislative shortcut” used to deal with noncontroversial
or minor pieces of legislation in the House, although it is increasingly being applied to substantively
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important bills as well (Oleszek et al. 2016, pg. 150). In the modern House, motions to suspend
the rules are not subject to the normal legislative calendar, and are in order on Mondays, Tuesdays,
and Wednesdays, as well as during the final days of the congressional session (Rybicki 2015).
Suspensions can also be made in order through special rules, a tactic used frequently by House
majorities in recent Congresses.3 Suspension of the rules allows a bill to come to the floor of the
House for 40 minutes of debate, after which the members vote on passage of the bill.4 Amendments
to suspension bills are not allowed, which facilitates an expedited procedure for their passage. As
a tradeoff for the fast-track procedural route these bills are given, they must receive a two-thirds
supermajority vote to pass the House.
These features of the suspension procedure, as well as the element of Speaker control over
suspension, are the product of nearly 200 years of historical evolution. At its genesis in 1822, the
motion to suspend the rules was not under the control of the House Speaker; any member could
move to suspend the rules for any bill they pleased.5 Historical experience from the early-to-mid
1800s, when suspension motions were largely unregulated by majority party leadership, proved that
members were inclined to bog down the House legislative agenda by making motions to suspend the
rules for their own “pet” bills (Bach 1990). In the pursuit of their own individual interests, minority
party members would make motions to suspend the rules on bills they knew would not pass, but
on which they wanted to force a vote. Thus, ironically, a procedural motion created to expedite
congressional business ended up diverting legislative attention to various extraneous individualistic
ends, and away from large-scale public policy issues. Beginning with Samuel J. Randall (D-PA) in
3According to data made available by the University of Georgia Congress Project, from the 111th to the 115th
Congresses the House passed over 200 special rules providing for suspensions on non-suspension days (Lynch
et al. 2020).
4The vote on the motion to suspend the rules acts as the vote to pass the underlying measure. Therefore, if the
motion to suspend the rules garners at least a two-thirds majority of those members present and voting, the
underlying measure is passed.
5In the first Congresses, bills would simply be dealt with in the order in which they were introduced. As a
response to the growth of the legislative agenda in the early years of the republic, the House developed its
first rule on the order of business in 1811 (Hinds 1907). In 1822, for the first time, the House allowed for a
suspension of the rules on the order of business, subject to a two-thirds vote. This suspension measure was
created specifically to allow the House to consider measures that would not be brought up under the regular
order of business.
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the early 1880s, House Speakers have asserted control over the motion to suspend the rules in order
to mitigate this problem (Hinds 1907, House 1935).6
Unsurprisingly, the majority party has been disproportionately favored in the distribution of
suspension bills over time. However, as Figure 2.3 below shows, majority party dominance of the
suspension agenda has declined since the early 1970s, as more bills are being considered under
suspension and the minority party demand for suspension bills has increased. Prior literature has
demonstrated that, both in decisions about procedure (Bawn 1998, Krehbiel & Wiseman 2005) and
policy (Balla et al. 2002), it is often rational for the majority party to consider the preferences of
minority party members. In the case of suspension of the rules, minority party members are able to
exercise leverage that they would not otherwise have due to the higher vote threshold for passage.
The two-thirds threshold allows the minority party to credibly threaten to defeat the suspension bills
of majority party members. In fact, there is precedent for this happening: during the 105th Congress
(1997-1999), members of the Democratic minority in the House defeated six consecutive suspension
bills in protest over what they felt was an unfair allocation of such bills in favor of the Republican
majority (Sinclair 2016).7 Interview evidence suggests that, in an attempt to avoid such breakdowns,
the split of suspension bills across parties has been negotiated by leadership staffers from both
parties.8 One House Democratic leadership staffer described the process: “It became a House policy,
unscripted, but a gentleman’s agreement, that the minority would get 30% [of suspension bills]. I
had asked on behalf of Pelosi for one-third, [a staffer in Tom DeLay’s office] had said one-quarter,
6Around this same time, the House began to develop another measure for bringing bills to the floor outside of
the normal order of business. These measures, referred to as special orders for consideration, were reported
out of the Rules Committee and, beginning in 1883, needed only a simple majority to pass the House (Hinds
1907). Special orders quickly became the norm for bringing bills to the floor, and their simple-majority rule
for passage made them the logical choice for partisan measures (Roberts 2010, Hendrickson & Roberts 2016).
Suspension of the rules, with its higher threshold for passage, became the vehicle by which noncontroversial
bills, or those with broad bipartisan support, would be brought to the floor.
7Later Democratic minorities continued to express a desire to expand the minority party share of the suspension
agenda. House Democrats during the 109th Congress (2005-2007) released two documents—A New Direction
for America and New House Principles: A Congress for All Americans—in which they specifically called
for minority-authored legislation considered under suspension of the rules to be “scheduled in relation to
the party ratio in the House.” In that same Congress, Rules Committee members James McGovern (D-MA),
Alcee Hastings (D-FL) and Doris Matsui (D-CA) went a step further by introducing H. Res. 686, which
proposed, among a number of other procedural changes, that “The Speaker shall endeavor to the maximum
extent possible to allow an equal number of bills and resolutions sponsored by majority party members and
minority party members under suspension during any session of Congress.”
8Interview, March 29th, 2019
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and we ended up at 30%, and that pretty much has held.”9
























































Note: Data compiled by author from the PIPC roll call database (Crespin & Rohde 2019), congress.gov, and
the Calendars of the United States House of Representatives.
In addition to concerns that the suspension agenda is too heavily weighted towards bills sponsored
by members of the majority party, minority party members have also frequently voiced dissatisfaction
with the procedural dimensions of suspension of the rules. Namely, occasional complaints have
alleged that the majority party abuses suspension in order to circumvent committee deliberation, shut
off amending opportunities, and avoid the motion to recommit.
9The increase in the minority party share of the suspension agenda over time, depicted in Figure 2.3 below,
could be indicative of a rather hollow concession from majority party leadership if minority-sponsored bills are
consistently defeated when brought up under suspension. However, the data strongly reject this interpretation
of events. Throughout the time period studied, less than 2.5% of suspension bills were defeated—and of
those bills that were defeated, 93.5% were sponsored by members of the majority party. Many of these bills
were then assigned a special rule for consideration from the Rules Committee, and were subsequently passed
on the floor.
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Speakers, then, operate under clear constraints when making decisions about which bills to give
consideration under suspension of the rules. My theory of suspension of the rules, laid out below,
seeks to provide systematic explanations for how majority party leaders have operated within these
constraints to achieve both party and chamber goals through the strategic distribution of suspension
agenda space.
2.3 A Theory of Suspension of the Rules
My theory of suspension of the rules focuses on the interplay between the individual member-level
demand for legislation, and the majority party leadership’s control over the supply of that legislation.
I argue that the majority party leadership uses its control over the legislative agenda to pursue a
number of different goals—namely maintaining the majority, facilitating the business of the House,
and incentivizing party loyalty.
My theory starts with a simple assumption that legislators in the House are interested in having
at least some of their introduced bills considered and passed on the floor. This motivation may spring
from a number of different sources. Wawro (2000) argues that members are interested in getting
bills passed in order to burnish their reputation as legislative entrepreneurs, which may ultimately
lead to their advancement within party leadership. A reputation for legislative effectiveness can
also make members more successful fundraisers (Box-Steffensmeier & Grant 1999). Additionally,
reelection-oriented members may be interested in getting their legislation considered and passed, as
such legislative success provides grounds for credit claiming to constituents (Mayhew 1974, Grimmer
et al. 2012). Regardless of the specific reason, I assume that all members of the House are, to some
degree or another, interested in having some of their introduced legislation successfully advance
towards enactment. The data I have collected suggest that suspension of the rules offers members
decently good odds at achieving this goal for certain types of proposals, as just over 49% of all bills
that passed the House on suspension from the 93rd-113th Congresses have become law.
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2.3.1 The Conditional Effect of Electoral Marginality
In the modern House, suspension of the rules often represents the most fruitful path for the advance-
ment of legislative proposals.10 This is especially true for particularistic bills dealing with district
issues, as these bills are far more likely to be considered under suspension of the rules than they
are to have a special rule reported for them by the Rules Committee. Typically, these bills do not
hold general interest for the chamber or the two parties, and, to the extent that the House deals with
such issues, it tends to do so under expedited procedures. Members who are especially interested in
cultivating opportunities for credit claiming in their districts, then, are generally reliant on getting
their bills considered under suspension.
Building on work by Lazarus (2009, 2010), Lazarus & Reilly (2010), Stein & Bickers (1994),
and Bickers & Stein (1996), I allow for the possibility that member demand for particularized district
benefits may vary systematically by partisanship and electoral vulnerability. Specifically, I posit
that the demand for parochial legislation will increase with electoral vulnerability, and that majority
party status will be instrumental in allowing legislators to meet this demand. The electoral benefits
of passing parochial legislation under suspension of the rules may not be realized directly, as it is
unlikely that a sizable number of constituents are paying close attention to their member’s legislative
record. However, as discussed by Stein & Bickers (1995, pg. 32), if the legislation in question is
important to some interest group with a presence in the district, that group can help mobilize the
electorate on behalf of the incumbent.
The types of bills that can provide these electoral benefits will likely be of interest to most
members of Congress—but particularly to those who are electorally vulnerable. One leadership
staffer described the relevant considerations from both sides of the aisle in the following way: “From
the minority perspective, you would want marginal members, new members that don’t have a long
legislative history, you would want to be able to get those voices out there with pieces of legislation.
10For example, in the 111th, 112th, and 113th Congresses, respectively, there were 113, 145, and 155 bills
that reached the House floor pursuant to special rules for consideration reported from the House Rules
Committee. By contrast, 1,370 bills in the 111th Congress, 389 bills in the 112th Congress, and 485 bills
in the 113th Congress were considered under suspension of the rules (Data collected by the author from
the Survey of Activities of the House Committee on Rules for the 111th, 112th, and 113th Congresses.).
While the instance of unified Democratic government in the 111th Congress stands out as a clear outlier, it is
evident in each of these Congresses that far more bills get considered under suspension of the rules than
through the Rules Committee.
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From the majority, you would be looking carefully, like, ‘I don’t want this guy who is marginal, or
this gal, to get too much credit.’”11 Given that the Speaker of the House has direct control over the
primary mechanism through which these types of bills reach the floor, my expectation is that this
control will be used to benefit electorally vulnerable members of the majority party, and selectively
screen electorally vulnerable members of the minority party.
• Hypothesis 1a: Electorally vulnerable majority party members will have more of their bills
considered under suspension of the rules than will other members of the majority party.
• Hypothesis 1b: Electorally vulnerable members of the minority party will have fewer of their
bills considered under suspension of the rules than will other members of the minority party.
2.3.2 Full Committee and Subcommittee Chairs
While the increasing centralization of staff resources and information in majority party leadership
offices has decreased the independent influence of committee chairs over the crafting of much impor-
tant legislation (Curry 2015; Bendix 2016; but see Curry 2018), chairmen are still instrumental in the
production of many bills. Data on bill introductions consistently bear this out, as both full committee
and subcommittee chairs introduce considerably more legislation than the average rank-and-file
member of the House (Volden & Wiseman 2014). Additionally, despite an increase in the rate at
which bills are extracted from committee by special rule rather than being reported to the floor,
committee chairs still serve an important role in leading markup and reporting activity within their
panels. Figure 2.4 below depicts a trend, beginning with the Republican majorities of the mid-1990s
and accelerating through the Democratic-controlled Houses of the 110th (2007-2009) and 111th
Congresses (2009-2011), in which bills were increasingly considered under suspension of the rules
without ever being reported from a committee. Interestingly, however, this trend began to slow, and
ultimately reverse, after Republicans regained the House majority in the 112th Congress (2011-2013).
11Interview, March 29th, 2019
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Note: Using data from the Congressional Bills Project (Adler & Wilkerson 2014) and the PIPC database
(Crespin & Rohde 2019), this figure breaks down the universe of bills that were considered under suspension
of the rules into those that were reported out of a standing committee in the House, and those that were not.
In their capacity as facilitators and producers of run-of-the-mill legislation, committee chairs—and
to a lesser extent, subcommittee chairs—provide an important service for the House, and for the
leaders of their party.12 Namely, they are uniquely situated to coordinate pre-floor legislative activity
by shepherding bills through their committees, sometimes building bipartisan consensus through
the markup process. From this position, they can help to serve leadership and chamber needs, and
thus may expect some of the constituency-oriented legislation they sponsor to be considered under
suspension of the rules, as a reward for performing this work. It is also likely that many of the
chair-sponsored measures considered under suspension are important reauthorization bills that they
have marked up within their committee.
12A House Democratic leadership staffer explained the legislative role this way: “As a majority party on the
floor—Speaker, Leader, Whip—you want to show legislation. That’s your job, is to legislate... So, it’s of
great importance, and a request from the leadership, to have committee chairs markup bills and get ready for
the floor.” (Interview, March 29th, 2019)
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The passage of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act in the 111th Congress
(2009-2011) provides an example of how the centralized and specialized institutional position of a
committee chair can allow for the sponsorship and House passage of an important piece of legislation
under suspension of the rules. As the 111th Congress drew to a close, it looked as though persistent
squabbles over a provision repealing the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy were going to
tank the defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2011. The stakes were high, as the bill sought to
authorize over $700 billion in appropriations for national security programs across the departments
of Defense and Energy. If Congress had failed to pass the bill, it would have been the first time in 49
years that a defense authorization bill was not sent to the president for his signature.
After it became clear that a Senate companion measure, also containing the “don’t ask, don’t
tell” repeal could not attract enough votes to invoke cloture, House Armed Services Committee chair
Ike Skelton (D-MO) met with his Senate counterpart, Carl Levin (D-MI), to construct a compromise
bill that would be able to get through both chambers before the end of the session. The bill dropped
the repeal provision, as well as a provision authorizing unrequested funds for a new F-35 fighter
jet engine that had drawn a veto threat from the Obama administration, and was introduced in the
House and referred to the Armed Services Committee and the Budget Committee. Two days after its
introduction, the compromise bill was passed by a large bipartisan margin under suspension of the
rules. The bill passed the Senate, was sent to President Obama, and became Public Law No. 111-383
on January 1st, 2011.
In this particular case, the use of suspension of the rules allowed Democratic congressional
leadership to narrowly avert the embarrassment of being unable to pass a routine authorization bill
during a period of unified government. It is unsurprising that Skelton was the sponsor of the bill that
was considered under suspension, as he was in the unique position to be able to craft a compromise
that he could ensure would pass both chambers on a condensed timetable.
I argue that full committee and subcommittee chairs will disproportionately sponsor legislation
considered under suspension of the rules not only as a function of their institutionalized ability to get
legislation to the floor, but also as compensation for performing work that is integral to their party’s
reputation, and to efficient operation of the House. Suspension measures that majority leadership
allow chairs to offer as compensation for their legislative work are unlikely to be important bills such
as the defense authorization, but rather locally focused bills that improve the sponsor’s standing in
28
their district, or special interest bills that burnish their reputation with influential interest groups. In
some cases, these bills will be completely unrelated to the jurisdiction of the chair’s committee.
For example, in the 113th Congress, Jason Chaffetz (R-UT)—serving as chair of the House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee—had a bill considered under suspension that autho-
rized the Secretary of the Interior to facilitate the production of hydroelectric power in his district.13
This bill had nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee, but gave Representative Chaffetz a custom-made opportunity to claim credit for a project
that would create jobs for and provide clean energy to constituents in his district.14 While every
representative would love to direct the focus of the nation’s legislature towards the betterment of
their own district, that focus is finite, and thus uses of suspension bills for these purposes must be
allocated prudently.
• Hypothesis 2: Full committee and subcommittee chairs will be favored in the distribution of
measures considered under suspension.
Moderate Majority Members: Buying Agenda Control
In addition to addressing routine legislative concerns, majority party leaders can use their control
over suspension of the rules to selectively incentivize and reward party behavior, such as voting
for procedural measures that help to advance the agenda of the party. The passage of restrictive
rules necessary for negative agenda control can often create policy losses for ideologically moderate
members of the majority party (Cox & McCubbins 2005, Jenkins & Monroe 2012a,b). Scholars
have demonstrated multiple avenues through which party leaders compensate these members, from
allowing them to offer amendments under structured rules (Lynch et al. 2016), to contributing to their
campaigns (Jenkins & Monroe 2012a), to considering more of their bills under suspension of the
rules (Moffett 2016).
I provide another test of the proposition put forth by Moffett (2016), as it fits with my theory of
member-level demand for suspension measures. Moderate majority party members, who frequently
13H.R. 254, the Bonneville Unit Clean Hydropower Facilitation Act (P.L. No. 113-20)
14“This is a win for federal tax payers, the environment, and energy users,” said Chaffetz in a press release.
“The Bonneville Unit Clean Hydropower Act [is] vital for securing diverse energy resources to meet the
demands of Utah’s growing population.”
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lose out on potential policy gains when their party exerts negative agenda control, may have a
particularly high demand for their personal priorities to be addressed under suspension of the rules.
As these members are also closer to the floor median, they are theoretically more likely to sponsor
legislation that may garner bipartisan support, which can be important for suspension measures
given their higher threshold for passage. To the extent that suspension measures are used to meet the
demands of individual members, majority leaders may strategically distribute these bills to moderate
members of their party in order to buy their support on restrictive rules that ultimately cut against
their ideological preferences.
These members will also be the most likely to be cross-pressured by their district and their
leadership—and ignoring district preferences to toe the party line can have considerable electoral
costs (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002, Carson et al. 2010, Erikson 1971). Skillful legislative leaders balance
the risks they ask their members to take with the benefits gained from passage of party priority bills.
Importantly, when leaders push their members to take a tough vote for the party, they need to be able
to adequately compensate those members for the risk they have incurred (King & Zeckhauser 2003).
The Speaker’s control over suspension of the rules is one potential mechanism through which the
majority party leadership can compensate members for taking risks in voting for party priorities.
• Hypothesis 3: Moderate members of the majority party will be more likely to have their bills
considered under suspension.
2.4 Data and Methods
I test the hypotheses laid out in the previous section with member-level data on the sponsorship of
bills considered by the House under suspension of the rules.15 I identified all suspension measures
that received roll call votes from the PIPC dataset (Crespin & Rohde 2019),16 and used congress.gov
15Following work on members’ legislative success in Congress by Anderson et al. (2003), Hasecke & Mycoff
(2007), Cox & Terry (2008), and others, I opt for a member-level analysis. This is an appropriate choice, as
my hypotheses are focused on how member-level characteristics are associated with access to the suspension
agenda.
16I created a subset of the PIPC data using the following categories to identify suspension measures: Pas-
sage/adoption of a bill under suspension of the rules; Passage/adoption of a joint resolution under suspension
of the rules; Passage/adoption of a concurrent resolution under suspension of the rules; Passage/adoption of
a resolution under suspension.
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and the Calendars of the United States House of Representatives to identify suspension measures that
received voice votes. This process yielded a comprehensive bill-level dataset of 11,862 measures
that were considered under suspension of the rules in the House from the 93rd-113th Congresses.17 I
then linked these bills to their sponsors through a bill-specific ID using data from the Congressional
Bills Project (Adler & Wilkerson 2014). I supplemented this dataset by merging in member-specific
information on ideology, status as a full committee or subcommittee chair, seniority, and bill
introductions from the Legislative Effectiveness Project (Volden & Wiseman 2014). Additionally,
I merged in congressional elections data from Jacobson (2015) to test my hypotheses about the
conditional effect of electoral marginality.
In order to create a dataset with member-Congress pairs as the units of analysis, I collapsed
the bill-level suspension data by member for each Congress, thus creating a dependent variable
measuring the number of suspension bills that each member offered in each Congress from the
93rd-113th.18 In order to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, I included a variable called Previous Vote Share,
created from Jacobson’s (2015) dataset, that measures the share of the two-party vote with which
the member won their seat for the relevant Congress. Additionally, I include a dummy variable
indicating whether the member was from the majority party. The key independent variables for
testing Hypothesis 2, full committee and subcommittee chair status, are dummy variables from the
Legislative Effectiveness Project, indicating whether a member is either a chair of a full committee
(Cmte. Chair) or a subcommittee (Subcmte. Chair).
17As Carr (2005) points out, suspension of the rules is occasionally used to agree to Senate amendments or
conference reports. I found 72 such instances in my initial data. These observations are excluded from
the analyses below, because I am only interested in the use of suspension to consider original, House-
sponsored measures. After excluding these 72 observations, I was left with 11,862 measures considered
under suspension of the rules.
18Members who did not serve an entire term in the House (either because of death, appointment to an executive
branch position, resignation, etc.) were excluded from the analysis for that term, along with members who
switched parties in the middle of a term in Congress.
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There are two independent variables necessary to test Hypothesis 3.19 The first, Moderate
Majority Member, is a dummy variable indicating whether a member of the majority party is on the
minority party side of the floor median, as in Moffett (2016) and Jenkins & Monroe (2012a). As
demonstrated by Jenkins & Monroe (2012b), these moderate members of the majority party suffer net
ideological losses as a result of negative agenda control exercised by their party leadership. Despite
the fact that the majority party in most recent Congresses is theoretically capable of holding together
its procedural cartel without these members, party leaders derive some utility from having more
than a bare majority of the chamber vote with them on procedural issues. Because these moderate
majority party members lose out from their party’s cartelization of the agenda, and thus may be
induced to defect to the minority party on certain votes, they are theorized to be prime targets for
side-payments by the majority party leadership. Preferential access to the suspension agenda may be
an example of such a side-payment (Moffett 2016), and therefore I expect majority party members on
the minority party side of the floor median to be favored in the distribution of suspension measures.
The other variable necessary to test Hypothesis 3 is a dichotomous variable indicating a majority
party member’s location in the first 30% of the ideological space moving from the floor median
towards the far boundary of the majority party blockout zone. The majority party blockout zone
is the space within which the party’s procedural cartel prevents any status quo policies from being
changed. As demonstrated in Figure 2.5 below, this zone extends from the floor median (F ) through
its reflection on the other side of the majority party median (M )—or from F to 2M − F .
19These variables are an indicator for whether a majority party members is located on the minority party
side of the floor median, and whether a majority party member is in the 30% zone. I do not include an
indicator for whether a member is located between the 30% zone boundary and the majority party median,
or an indicator for whether a member is located between the majority party median and the far edge of the
majority party blockout zone. My aim is not to compare coefficient sizes across these various indicators,
as in Jenkins & Monroe (2012b). Instead, I take as a given that majority members on the minority party
side of the median and in the 30% zone incur losses from their party’s cartelization of the agenda, and I
am interested in whether the indicator variables I include have coefficients that are positive and statistically
significant, particularly in the Majority Sponsors model presented below. I present models in Appendix B
with four indicators: majority party member on the minority party side of the floor median, majority party
member in the 30% zone, majority party member between the 30% zone and the majority party median, and
majority party member between the majority party median and the far edge of the blockout zone. The results
presented in the body of the chapter are robust to the inclusion of these variables.
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Figure 2.5: Majority Party Blockout Zone and 30% Zone
Note: Figure from Jenkins & Monroe (2012a)
Majority party members located in the first 30% of this space, or the 30% zone, incur net utility
losses under negative agenda control exercised by their party. These members are critical to the
majority’s procedural cartel, but have ideologically-based incentives to defect, and therefore must be
kept in the fold through side-payments, such as access to the suspension agenda. In the regression
models below, I label this variable 30% Zone.
I include a number of control variables at both the member-level and the Congress-level. At
the member level, I control for both member seniority, and bill introductions by member. The
Seniority variable measures the number of consecutive terms a member has served in the House,
and is included with the expectation that members who have served longer will likely have more of
their bills considered under suspension of the rules. Bill Introductions comes from the Legislative
Effectiveness Project data, and is the total number of bills that each member introduces in each
Congress. The inclusion of this control variable is fundamental to the model, as bill introductions by
members are an integral part of the data generating process. Members must introduce legislation
in order to have it considered under suspension of the rules, so I would expect, all else equal, that
members who introduce more legislation will have more bills considered under suspension.
Lastly, I include four Congress-level control variables. I include a variable measuring the
percentage of special rules that are restrictive in each Congress, following work by Wolfensberger
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(2002) and Chappie (2003), who argue that party leaders may increase suspensions to mollify rank-
and-file members who are frustrated by an increasingly closed-off floor procedure.20 This variable
is called Percent Restrictive Rules in the results presented below, and was created using data made
available through the University of Georgia Congress Project (Lynch et al. 2020).
I also include a control for the size of the majority party in the House, called Margin of Control
in the models below. This data was collected from the website history.house.gov. I expect that the
use of suspension of the rules will be more frequent when the majority party is relatively small. Since
passing controversial partisan legislation is exceedingly difficult with a small majority party, given
any degree of ideological heterogeneity (Harbridge 2015, pg. 53), I expect the legislative agenda in
these Congresses to skew towards the types of broad consensus, or commemorative, bills that are
typically considered under suspension of the rules (Dodd & Schraufnagel 2009).
In order to control for the size of the non-suspension agenda in the House, I include the a variable,
collected from the Calendars of the United States House of Representatives, for the total number of
House-sponsored bills that passed the House by routes other than suspension of the rules in each
Congress. This variable is called Total Bills Passed by Non-Suspension Routes in the models below.
Because Cooper & Young (1989) argue that majority party leaders are more likely to use
procedures that limit debate and amending when the workload of the House increases, I include a
variable—Total Bills Considered—for the total number of measures considered on the floor of the
House in each Congress. This data was collected through congress.gov.
For my main empirical analyses, I model the number of suspension measures a member will
sponsor in a Congress as a function of the key independent variables and controls.21 My dependent
variable is modeled as a count, since the number of suspension measures for a given member in
a given Congress is discrete and cannot take on a negative value. A negative binomial model is
appropriate for the data, as the distribution of the dependent variable, conditional on the independent
variables, is considerably overdispersed. Because of the hierarchical nature of the data—members
20In a 2003 Roll Call article, Chappie writes, “the suspension process has turned into a sort of safety valve,
effectively letting of legislative steam while allowing the House leadership to maintain tight control over the
process of lawmaking with restrictive rules that curtail amendments and debate” (Chappie 2003).
21All continuous independent variables (Previous Vote Share, Seniority, Bill Introductions, Margin of Control,
Percent Restrictive Rules, Total Bills Passed by Non-Suspension Routes, and Total Bills Considered) are
standardized using the scale() function in R. Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix A.
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nested within Congresses—a multilevel modeling approach is used, with varying intercepts for both
Congress and sponsor.22
2.5 Results
Table 2.1 displays the results of the models. I fit four different models: the first on a subset including
only the minority party members in the dataset, the second on a subset including only the majority
party members in the dataset, and the third and fourth on the full dataset. The fourth model differs
from the third in that it includes an interaction between majority party status and the vote share
variable, to test whether the effect of electoral marginality on the expected count of suspension
measures is conditional on the sponsor being in the majority party.
I find qualified support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b, cumulatively stating that the effect of electoral
marginality on the expected count of suspension measures is conditional on majority party status. The
positive and statistically significant (p < .01) coefficient on the Previous Vote Share variable in the
Minority Sponsors model demonstrates that minority party members with higher vote shares—those
who are more electorally safe—can expect to have more of their sponsored legislation considered
under suspension of the rules. A one-standard deviation increase in the share of the two-party vote
received by a minority party incumbent in the previous election (an increase of about 9.5 percentage
points) increases the expected log count of measures considered on suspension by 0.121. This
supports Hypothesis 1b.
In the Majority Sponsors model, the coefficient on the Previous Vote Share variable was unex-
pectedly positive, although relatively small and statistically insignificant. However, the negative
and statistically significant (p < 0.01) coefficient on the Previous Vote Share X Majority Party
interaction in the final model indicates that the effect of electoral marginality is, in fact, conditional
on majority party status. Figure 2.6, below, graphs this interaction to allow the reader to visualize the
effect. It is clear that the most electorally vulnerable minority party members (those with the lowest
22Including a varying intercept by Congress allows me to account for Congress-level factors that may affect the
size of the suspension agenda. For example, House Democrats in the 93rd and 95th Congresses increased the
number of days on which suspension measures could be considered, and Republicans in the 109th Congress
adopted party rules restricting the types of measures that could be considered under suspension. These rules
changes, while not explicitly modeled, should be reflected in the intercept for each Congress. Including a
varying intercept by member allows me to control for any time-invariant member-level characteristics that
may be relevant for having bills considered under suspension of the rules.
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Table 2.1: Modeling the Expected Count of Suspension Measures by Member
Dependent variable:
Suspension Measures (Count)
Minority Sponsors Majority Sponsors Pooled Model Interaction
Congress-Level Controls
Percent Restrictive Rules 0.015 −0.122 −0.090 −0.088
(0.094) (0.125) (0.116) (0.114)
Margin of Control −0.100 −0.135 −0.127 −0.121
(0.068) (0.079) (0.073) (0.072)
Total Bills Passed by Non-Suspension Routes −0.712∗ −0.650∗ −0.696∗ −0.695∗
(0.117) (0.142) (0.131) (0.130)
Total Bills Considered 0.533∗ 0.376∗ 0.436∗ 0.442∗
(0.051) (0.071) (0.065) (0.064)
Member-Level Variables
Previous Vote Share 0.121∗ 0.005 0.017 0.082∗
(0.033) (0.021) (0.018) (0.029)
Seniority 0.012 0.010 0.025 0.023
(0.032) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020)
Bills Introduced 0.307∗ 0.328∗ 0.337∗ 0.336∗
(0.038) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Cmte. Chair 0.862∗ 0.824∗ 0.841∗
(0.064) (0.059) (0.060)
Subcmte. Chair 0.492∗ 0.482∗ 0.491∗
(0.041) (0.038) (0.039)
Moderate Majority −0.054 −0.112 −0.130
(0.071) (0.068) (0.068)
30% Zone 0.002 −0.044 −0.062
(0.054) (0.052) (0.052)
Majority Party Member 0.638∗ 0.644∗
(0.040) (0.040)
Previous Vote Share X Majority Party Member −0.095∗
(0.033)
Constant −1.051∗ −0.203∗ −0.858∗ −0.861∗
(0.055) (0.065) (0.059) (0.059)
Sponsor Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Congress Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,437 4,270 7,707 7,707
Log Likelihood −3,195.781 −6,611.321 −9,828.446 −9,824.327
∗p<0.05
Note: Coefficients are from multilevel negative binomial models with varying intercepts estimated by bill
sponsor and Congress. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The unit of analysis is a member-
Congress.
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previous vote share) are significantly less likely than their majority party counterparts to have their
legislation considered under suspension of the rules. Strikingly, as minority party members become
more electorally safe, they become more likely to have their bills considered under suspension of the
rules, all else equal. On the other hand, electoral safety actually decreases the expected number of
bills that a majority party member will have considered under suspension. This is clear evidence that
electorally vulnerable members of the majority party are systematically favored in the distribution
of suspension measures, while electorally vulnerable minority party members are systematically
disfavored.
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As is evident from the Majority Sponsors, Pooled, and Interaction models, I find strong support
for Hypothesis 2—stating that full committee and subcommittee chairs are favored in the distribution
of suspension measures. The coefficients on both the committee chair variable and the subcommittee
chair variable are positive and statistically significant (p < .01) for every model in which they are
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included. Focusing on the Majority Sponsors models, being a committee chair, as opposed to being a
non-chair majority party member, increases a member’s expected log count of suspension measures
by 0.862. The equivalent effect for being a subcommittee chair is an increase of 0.492 in the expected
log count of measures considered under suspension. These are similar effect sizes to those in the
Pooled and Interaction models, for which the reference categories are all other members of the House
(as opposed to all other majority party members of the House, as is the case in the Majority Party
Only model.)
While the models presented above make it clear that chairs of full committees and subcom-
mittees have been consistently favored in the distribution of suspension bills, Figure 2.7 gives a
more granular look at the data by breaking down suspension measure sponsors in each Congress
by majority party status and institutional position. The figure is a stacked bar graph that breaks out
the sponsors of suspension measures into four categories: committee chairs, subcommittee chairs,
rank-and-file majority members (those who do not hold either a full committee or subcommittee
chair), and minority party members. It displays the percentage of all suspension measures sponsored
by legislators from each of these categories. One caveat for interpreting the graph is that the sizes of
the groups have not remained perfectly consistent over time.23
23House standing committees during the time period of our study have ranged from a low of 19 (104th-108th
Congresses) to a high of 22 (93rd-103rd Congresses). The number of subcommittees has exhibited more
variation over time, ranging from a low of 84 in the 104th Congress to a high of 151 in the 94th Congress.
The average number of subcommittees across all Congresses in the data is just over 106. On average, full
committee and subcommittee chairs comprise just over 27% of the full House. This figure was at its lowest
in the 106th Congress, when just under 23% of House members held a full committee or subcommittee
chair, and it peaked in the 96th, when just over one-third of all House members held a full committee or
subcommittee chair.
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Member Type Cmte. Chairs Subcmte. Chairs Maj. Party Rank and File Min. Party Members
Note: This figure uses data on all House-sponsored measures considered under suspension of the rules,
collected from the PIPC roll call database (Crespin & Rohde 2019), congress.gov, and the Calendars of the
United States House of Representatives. Data from the Legislative Effectiveness Project (Volden & Wiseman
2014) was used for members’ partisanship and institutional positions.
Despite the variation in the sizes of the majority party and the number of full committee and
subcommittee chairs across time, Figure 2.7 provides a helpful visualization of how suspension
measures have been distributed in the postreform House. It is evident that suspension measures have
gone from being the nearly-exclusive province of full committee and subcommittee chairs in the
mid-1970s, to being much more evenly distributed across groups in more recent Congresses. In the
93rd Congress (1973-1975), the 22 committee chairs in the House, despite making up just over 5%
of the full chamber, sponsored roughly one-third of all measures considered under suspension of
the rules. The relative gains made by the minority party over time have come largely as a result
of the erosion of this full committee and subcommittee chair dominance of suspension measures.
Rank-and-file majority party members, those not holding a full committee or subcommittee chair,
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have also gained more of a share of suspension measures over time, although this is at least partially
a function of the decrease in the number of subcommittees since the 104th Congress (1995-1997).
Figure 2.8 below lends a sense of scale to the results reported in Table 2.1. Among other
interesting patterns, Figure 2.8 emphasizes the relative rarity with which most members of the House
have their introduced measures considered under suspension of the rules across most of the time
period I examine. The only Congresses in my data in which an average member of the House,
who did not hold a subcommittee or full committee chair, could be expected to have a single bill
considered under suspension are the 106th-111th Congresses (1999-2011). The average minority
party member in the House could expect to have at least one bill considered under suspension of the
rules in only the 108th-111th Congresses (2003-2011).24
24In Figure 2.8, there is a clear peak in suspension activity at the 111th Congress that falls precipitously in
the 112th Congress. This can be explained by the fact that Democrats had the largest majority in the House
since the early 1990s, a sizeable majority in the Senate, and a Democratic president in the White House.
This situation of unified government generally helps to account for the apparent burst of legislative activity.
The dropoff in the 112th Congress coincides with the 2010 midterm election, which brought a Republican
majority to the House, making for a largely unproductive Congress during a period of newly-divided
government.
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Member Type Committee Chair Subcommittee Chair Majority Rank and File Minority Party
Note: This figure uses data on all House-sponsored measures considered under suspension of the rules,
collected from the PIPC roll call database (Crespin & Rohde 2019), congress.gov, and the Calendars of the
United States House of Representatives. Data from the Legislative Effectiveness Project (Volden & Wiseman
2014) was used for members’ partisanship and institutional positions.
Interestingly, I find no support for Hypothesis 3—that moderate members of the majority party
would have more of their sponsored legislation get consideration under suspension. Neither the
Moderate Majority variable nor the 30% Zone variable attain statistical significance in the Majority
Sponsors model, demonstrating that location in these particular ideological ranges is not expected
to increase the count of measures that moderate majority party members get considered under
suspension, relative to their co-partisans. The coefficients on the Moderate Majority variable in both
the Pooled and Interaction models are negative and statistically significant (p < 0.1), meaning that
being a majority party member on the minority party side of the floor median is associated with an
expected decrease in the number of sponsored bills considered under suspension of the rules. In
these models, the reference category for the Moderate Majority indicator variable is all minority
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party members, and all majority party members who are on the majority party side of the floor
median. Compared to these members, majority party members on the minority party side of the floor
median are expected to see a statistically significant decrease of 0.130 in the log count of measures
considered under suspension (focusing on the Interaction model). While moderate members of the
majority party may occasionally be allowed to offer bills under suspension of the rules in order to
help offset their policy losses under negative agenda control, my analyses do not indicate that this
happens systematically.
2.5.1 Suspension for Commemorative vs. Non-Commemorative Legislation
It is possible that there are systematic differences in the way the suspension procedure operates for
different types of legislation. For example, Moffett (2016) shows that minor bills are more likely to
be considered under suspension of the rules. However, the descriptive data presented in this chapter
make it clear that substantive legislation is also frequently considered under suspension. Do majority
party leaders use a different set of criteria when deciding whether to grant suspension consideration
to a commemorative versus a substantive bill?
While a comprehensive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this chapter, and is a
promising area for future work, I am able to provide some analytical leverage here. I split my data
into commemorative and noncommemorative bills considered under suspension, and fit models
similar to the ones presented above on those subsets of the data.25 Full results of these analyses are
available in Appendix B, but in Figure 2.9 below I have plotted the exponentiated coefficients from
the pooled negative binomial model (similar to the Pooled model in Table 2.1).
25The only difference between these models and the models in Table 2.1 is that, in lieu of the Bills Introduced
variable from Table 2.1, I use a variable measuring commemorative bills introduced for the Commemorative
Bills model, and a variable measuring non-commemorative bills introduced for the Non-Commemorative
Bills model. I am able to construct these variables using the breakdowns of introduced bill types provided by
Volden & Wiseman (2014).
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Note: The points on the plot represent exponentiated coefficients from two multilevel negative binomial
models—one which uses a count of commemorative suspension measures as the dependent variable (grey
dots), and the other which uses a count of non-commemorative suspension measures as the dependent variable
(black dots). The whiskers on the dots represent standard errors. The models were fit using all of the
Congress-level controls from Table 2.1, but they are excluded from this figure.
Figure 2.9 shows a couple of clear patterns that help illuminate the use of suspension of the
rules. Being a subcommittee chair offers no statistically significant benefit in terms of the expected
count of commemorative suspension measures. However, subcommittee chair status does correspond
with an expected increase in the number of non-commemorative suspension measures. Additionally,
the coefficients on the Majority Party Member variable demonstrate that majority party members
are more heavily favored in the distribution of non-commemorative suspension measures compared
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to commemorative suspension measures, although the coefficients in both models are positive and
statistically significant. The strong committee chair effects evident in the models from Table 2.1
stay consistent in these models, although the Cmte. Chair coefficient from the non-commemorative
bills model is slightly larger than the coefficient from the commemorative bills model. Interestingly,
members in the 30% zone appear to be disfavored in the distribution of non-commemorative bills
and favored in the distribution of commemorative bills, although the coefficients on the 30% Zone
variable do not attain statistical significance in either model. This provides suggestive, although
far from definitive, evidence of side-payments being made to these members. I would expect these
side-payments, if they were being made in the form of access to the legislative agenda, to be focused
on more commemorative or valence issues, as opposed to more substantive legislation proposals that
would likely be quashed by negative agenda control if offered by ideologically moderate members of
the majority.
2.6 Conclusion
As the descriptive data clearly demonstrate, from the 93rd Congress (1973-1975) through the 113th
Congress (2013-2015), an increasing share of the legislative business of the House has been conducted
under suspension of the rules. In fact, suspension of the rules has been the modal procedure by which
legislative measures pass the House since the 106th Congress (1999-2001). During the time period
I examine, the share of measures considered under suspension that are sponsored by members of
the minority party has grown from less than 10% in the 93rd Congress (1973-1975) to around 30%
from the 108th (2003-2005) to the 113th (2013-2015) Congresses. Rather than an indicator of truly
increased bipartisanship, I interpret the increase in reliance on suspension of the rules as a reflection
of a change in the composition of the House legislative agenda (Crespin et al. 2011).
Given the sustained increasing trend in the use of restrictive rules by the majority party beginning
with the 104th Congress (1995-1997), amending activity has been considerably reduced, thereby
diminishing the opportunity for many members to build a legislative record and obtain votes on mea-
sures of personal importance. In recent Congresses, representatives who seek to sponsor legislation
that makes it to the House floor—whether they be motivated by constituency concerns, signaling to
interest groups and donors, or simply establishing a record of legislative effectiveness—may well
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view the suspension route as the most fruitful. The member-level demand to have bills considered
under suspension of the rules is formally regulated by the Speaker of the House, who decides which
measures will be considered under this procedural route. The Speaker exercises her discretion over
the use of suspension of the rules to further a number of goals, ranging from efficiently conducting
legislative business to selectively allocating credit-claiming opportunities to certain members. Ad-
ditionally, the shift toward a heavier reliance on passing bills under suspension of the rules could
be a manifestation of Harbridge’s strategic partisan agenda-setting framework (Harbridge 2015).
Especially in the recent Congresses of the insecure majorities era (Lee 2016), majority party leaders
may be turning to suspension of the rules as a mechanism through which to build a party reputation
for good governance and the ability to successfully address valence issues in a bipartisan manner.
One particularly strong finding from my empirical analyses demonstrates that measures spon-
sored by full committee and subcommittee chairs are disproportionately likely to be considered under
suspension. I take this finding to be, in part, an indicator of these members’ institutionally privileged
positions within the House—which allow them to generate support for their bills within their own
committees, and then communicate that support to majority party leaders as evidence that their bills
should be considered under suspension. Importantly, though, I also argue that these members are
allowed to offer more narrow, constituency-oriented bills under suspension of the rules as a reward
for the legislative work they perform for the majority party, and for the chamber.
Additionally, I find empirical evidence for what one Democratic leadership staffer referred
to as “the political screen”26—namely that the Speaker’s discretion over suspension of the rules
may be used to systematically exclude electorally vulnerable members of the minority party, while
funneling opportunities towards vulnerable majority party members. Given that measures considered
under suspension of the rules often have the look of custom-made credit claiming opportunities, it
is unsurprising that partisan electoral motivations would affect leadership decisions about who can
offer them.
While I did not uncover systematic evidence that suspension of the rules is used to “buy” the votes
of moderate majority party members, I would argue that these sorts of transactional deals certainly
occur on a case-by-case basis. Allowing a member to bring a bill to the floor under suspension of the
26Interview, March 29th, 2019
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rules is just one tool in the majority party leadership toolbox—and likely not the most powerful one.
Sought-after committee assignments, spots in the extended party leadership network (Meinke 2016),
the ability to offer amendments under a structured rule (Lynch et al. 2016), and support from the
party’s campaign arm (Jenkins & Monroe 2012a) are all valuable resources that may be given or
withheld by majority party leadership, and these various inducements are likely used in occasional
combination with the selective granting of suspension.
Suspension of the rules is a dynamic and flexible tool that serves a number of different purposes in
the House of Representatives. From the perspective of an individual member, the procedure represents
the ability to have their voice heard above the cacophony of 434 other members. Importantly, from
the perspective of the individual member, it allows them to direct the attention of the House towards
noncontroversial but parochial bills that constituents will appreciate. Most members of the House do
not have strong preferences over whether the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to facilitate the
production of hydroelectric power at a facility in Utah,27 or whether the Forestry Department allows
for the construction of an elementary school on federal land in Nevada,28 or whether the Secretary
of Education is authorized to make a grant to Texas A&M University.29 However, the sponsors of
those suspension bills—Jason Chaffetz (R-UT), Jim Gibbons (R-NV), and Joe Barton (R-TX)—and
their constituents, care immensely about these issues. These members all had the ability to tell voters
and influential groups in their district that no less a body than the U.S. House of Representatives
considered, and passed, these bills dealing with hyper-local concerns. Opportunities such as these
are viewed by members as fundamental to the achievement of their electoral, and occasionally their
policy, goals.
In this chapter, I applied a theoretical framework emphasizing the member-level demand for
suspension measures, as well as the role of those measures in helping majority party leaders achieve
chamber and party objectives, to explain the distribution of these measures across members and
parties. Given the increasing rate at which House legislative business is being dealt with under
suspension of the rules, it is particularly important to develop a nuanced understanding of how this
27H.R. 254, 113th Congress
28H.R. 4656, 106th Congress
29H.R. 3803, 104th Congress
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procedure operates in practice, and why it operates the way it does. This work represents a step in
that direction.
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CHAPTER 3: PRE-FLOOR BUNDLING IN THE HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE:
DRIVERS AND IMPLICATIONS OF AN UNORTHODOX PROCESS
“My friends across the aisle continue to play fast and loose with their pledge to address one
issue at a time[...] H.R. 2954 is 10 unrelated bills stitched together. Some of the provisions
we are looking at today are not controversial, but rather than pass noncontroversial
provisions through less contentious means, my friends have packaged them together with
partisan measures for rank political purposes. It is Frankenstein’s parliamentary monster.”
-Alcee Hastings (D-FL), Congressional Record, February 5th, 2014
3.1 Introduction
House Resolution 472, the object of Representative Hastings’ (D-FL) lament in the quote above,
was a special rule reported by the House Rules Committee governing the floor consideration of H.R.
2954, the Public Access and Lands Improvement Act. Hastings’ primary procedural complaint about
the rule was that it made in order a substitute amendment that would turn a four-page bill conveying
a parcel of land to Escambia County, FL into a 40-page public lands bill with national implications
for environmental policy, natural resource conservation, and the protection of endangered species.
Representative Doc Hastings (R-WA), the Republican chair of the Natural Resources committee
at the time, was quick to push back against allegations that his party was violating “regular order”
by allowing for the substitute amendment. He mentioned in floor debate that the 10 individual bills
that became part of the package had all received individual consideration in his committee before
being combined by the amendment made in order by H. Res. 472.1 While this is true of the bills in
question in this particular instance, a systematic evaluation of the use of special rules to combine
bills together at the pre-floor stage reveals a flexible process that occasionally transcends standing
committee jurisdictions and precludes the traditional committee consideration process.
1Doc Hastings (R-WA), Congressional Record, February 6th, 2014
This chapter seeks to empirically examine the use of this evolving practice in the House of
Representatives in order to better understand the conditions under which majority parties rely on such
resolutions, and the characteristics of legislation included in such packages. My findings demonstrate
that this practice operates differently from more traditional omnibus legislating, as studied by Krutz
(2001) and others. The packages of bills that I study are not particulalry likely to become law—a
fact which undermines conventional explanations for omnibus legislating. Additionally, bills that are
opposed by the minority party in committee are more likely to be included in these bill packages,
and the packages themselves are disproportionately likely to receive a party unity vote on the floor.
This suggests that the construction of these packages is informed more by intraparty considerations
and party messaging strategies than by the desire to build bipartisan support.
These findings have important implications for our understanding of agenda setting in the House,
and for efforts to measure individual-level legislative effectiveness by focusing on bill advancement
(Volden & Wiseman 2014). Focusing on the policy areas and standing committees that are most
frequently involved in these pre-floor bill combinations can help shed light on the specifics of majority
party strategy and coalition maintenance techniques. Additionally, because some bills that are given
floor consideration are actually agglomerations of multiple bills sponsored by different members,
this suggests that measures of legislative effectiveness that depend on bill sponsorship (Volden &
Wiseman 2014) may be telling an incomplete story.2 This chapter raises important questions about
whose bills are likely to be included in the packages that are given floor consideration.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First I place my work in the context of the relevant literatures
on omnibus legislating, legislative procedure, agenda setting, and party messaging. Then I lay out
a theory of pre-floor bundling in the House, and provide testable hypotheses about the use of this
unorthodox procedure. In the next section, I describe my data collection process and empirical tests.
After discussing the results of these tests, I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the broader
implications of my findings, and of potential future directions for related research.
2A similar argument is made by Casas et al. (2020), who use a supervised learning technique to identify
legislative “hitchhikers”—or bills that are ultimately enacted into law as provisions of larger bills.
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3.2 Pre-Floor Bundling in Context
Special rules for consideration reported by the House Rules Committee are important institutional
mechanisms for setting the legislative agenda and structuring the available choice sets over which
votes are cast (Bach & Smith 1989). The organizing resolution that establishes the chamber rules
each Congress specifies that the majority party will hold a supermajority of seats on the House
Rules Committee, partially to ensure that the committee acts as a faithful partisan agent in agenda
setting. Most major legislation is assigned a special rule for consideration by the Rules Committee
before reaching the floor, and that rule determines the duration of debate on the bill, as well as which
amendments, if any, will be in order. As such, these resolutions allow for the careful and strategic
structuring of the choices put in front of legislators. Special rules for consideration can be written
to protect cross-pressured members from taking politically-risky votes, to suppress questions that
may reveal fractures in the majority party, or to accentuate the differences between the two parties on
salient issues.
This chapter focuses specifically on the House Rules Committee practice of bundling multiple
bills together for floor consideration as one package. This once-unorthodox practice has become
increasingly prevalent in the past decade. Recent work by Meinke (2020) explores a related, but
distinct, practice of bringing multiple bills to the floor under one rule, and demonstrates how
this procedural manuever affords majority party leaders the flexibility to pursue multiple goals
simultaneously. Bringing multiple separate bills to the floor under one special rule allows leaders
to efficiently manage floor time, and can also facilitate party messaging goals by training the
chamber’s attention on multiple bills that are important to the majority party’s brand (Lee 2016, Cox
& McCubbins 2005). Additionally, Meinke (2020) explains that this practice helps leaders to balance
party and individual member goals by strategically pairing together leadership priority bills with bills
that advance more individualistic priorities.
While both multiple-measures rules and the “bundling” rules considered in this chaoter bring
multiple bills to the floor for consideration, they do so in fundamentally different ways. Multiple-
measures rules are procedural mechanisms by which multiple separate measures are brought to
the floor to receive separate votes—and occasionally to be considered under different parameters.
For example, a multiple-measures rule could specify a closed rule for one bill, and a structured
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rule for another. In contrast, the bundling rules that are the focus of this chapter provide for the
combination of multiple bills into one legislative package that is then considered as one bill on the
floor. Bundling rules create these combinations by one of two paths—either by making in order a
substitute amendment that would replace the text of a single bill with the combined texts of multiple
bills, or by making that amendment self-executing pursuant to passage of the rule.
The practice of pre-floor bundling in the Rules Committee also shares some similarities with
omnibus legislating. Although there is no mutually agreed-upon technical definition for omnibus
legislating, scholars have generally identified omnibus bills by some combination of the number of
issue areas covered, the length of the bill, and the complexity of the bill (Krutz 2001, Sinclair 2016,
Oleszek et al. 2016). Perhaps the most widely accepted characterization of omnibus legislating is
that omnibus bills are understood to be made up of multiple individual bills that were eventually
rolled into one package. Hanson & Reynolds (2018) write specifically about omnibus appropriations
bills, which are typically introduced as a package of multiple previously-introduced individual
appropriations bills. Krutz (2001, pg. 46) casts a wider net, defining an omnibus bill as any piece
of major legislation that meets a number of scope and length requirements.3 Work by Casas et al.
(2020), while not primarily interested in defining omnibus legislation per se, is nonetheless relevant
because it focuses on identifying bills that become law as provisions of larger legislative packages.
One common element of case selection binds together the work by Krutz (2001), Hanson &
Reynolds (2018), and Casas et al. (2020)—but separates that vein of scholarship from the work
presented here. Namely, these treatments of omnibus legislating select on—or, in the case of
Krutz (2001), come close to selecting on—the enactment of a bill into law. Hanson & Reynolds
(2018) are interested in identifying non-spending provisions that become law as part of omnibus
appropriations bills, and Casas et al. (2020)—while explicitly excluding appropriations bills—are
similarly interested in identifying legislative hitchhikers that are ultimately enacted into law. While
Krutz (2001) does not specifically select on enactment, 98% of the omnibus bills in his dataset
became law (Krutz 2001, pg. 62).
This constitutes an important difference between omnibus legislating as it has typically been
studied, and the pre-floor bundling rules I consider here. While the authors cited above have valid
3Specifically, for Krutz (2001), omnibus bills must span at least three major topic areas or at least 10 subtopic
policy areas (Baumgartner & Jones 2013) and be longer than the average bill by at least one standard deviation.
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reasons for focusing on bills that ultimately become law, selecting on enactment elides important
questions about why certain bills are combined together into packages in the first place. The
frequently-used metaphor of a train leaving the station is apt, as the inevitability of the train’s arrival
is all that is necessary to explain passengers’ demand to get on board. If enactment is a foregone
conclusion, the interesting questions become about which bills get attached, and which types of
decision rules can be deduced by examining the process. However, as my examination of pre-floor
bundling in the House Rules Committee demonstrates, not all legislative packages are destined to
become law—and it is likely that the actors involved in their construction are aware of this.4
3.3 Explaining the Use of Bundling Rules
Why, then, are certain bills bundled together rather than being considered on the floor individually?
Time management is one potential answer—and one that Meinke (2020) finds mixed support for in
his study of multiple-measures rules. The argument here is fairly intuitive. Consider the case of H.R.
2578, the Conservation and Economic Growth Act introduced by Jeff Denham (R-CA) in the 112th
Congress. H. Res. 688, the rule under which the bill was considered, contained a self-executing
amendment that combined the text of the existing half-page bill with the text of 13 other bills to
create a 106-page legislative package for floor consideration. The time-saving effect of considering
this 14-bill package as one bill on the floor is obvious and substantial.
Particularly as fundraising activities take up more of members’ time, many legislators may look
to decrease the amount of time they have to spend on the floor debating and voting on legislation
(Heberlig & Larson 2005). In this light, the strategy of pre-floor bundling looks particularly attractive.
However, while it is possible that this scheduling strategy came about as a response to increased
non-legislative demands on members’ time, we would not expect it to be used with equal frequency
across all policy areas or types of bills. Because an alternative—and technically more effective—time-
saving method would be to not bring the legislation to the floor at all, we must also consider the
importance of the specific legislation in question to the goals of the majority party.
4Suzan DelBene (D-WA), whose Green Mounatin Lookout Heritage Protection Act bill was included, presum-
ably without her consent, in the GOP-constructed 10-bill Public Access and Lands Improvement Act, spoke
to this phenomenon: “The Green Mountain Lookout presents a significant piece of the Pacific Northwest’s
history, and it deserves to be protected for outdoor enthusiasts to enjoy for years to come. It does not deserve
to be wrapped up in a package of bills that we all know will be dead on arrival in the Senate” (Congressional
Record, February 6th, 2014).
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The agenda setting process in the House is infused with considerations about how bills will
affect the majority party’s brand (Cox & McCubbins 2005). However, it is not immediately clear why
or how a bundle of bills packaged together in the Rules Committee would better serve the party’s
brand than a series of bills considered individually. One potential explanation has to do with the
electoral needs and policy preferences of individual majority party members. Work by Canes-Wrone
et al. (2002), Carson et al. (2010), Koger & Lebo (2017, ch. 4), and others demonstrates that partisan
voting records can be electorally costly for legislators. Additionally, Nyhan et al. (2012) and Bussing
et al. (2020) document the negative electoral implications of individual votes cast on highly-salient
partisan legislation. Lindstädt & Vander Wielen (2014) show that majority party leaders, likely
because they are aware of the electoral risk involved with casting votes on partisan legislation, tend to
avoid scheduling such bills near an upcoming election. If each vote cast by a majority party legislator
on a contentious partisan bill entails some marginal increase in electoral risk, it would make sense
to decrease the number of specific instances in which legislators are asked to do this.5 Bundling
multiple contentious bills into one package, and doing so in a venue like the Rules Committee which
is less publicly salient than the House floor, could certainly serve this purpose.
Another relevant consideration is the policy preferences of individual members. Perhaps the
most important observable implication of partisan agenda setting in the cartel theory vein is that
the majority party is rarely ever deeply divided on legislation that makes it to the floor (Cox &
McCubbins 2005). What is typically less explored, however, is the extent to which this partisan
cohesion is a product of the agenda setting process itself. It is unclear how much of the partisan
cohesion we observe on the floor comes from an agenda setting process that selects bills on which the
majority party is already unified, and how much is a reflection of pre-floor intraparty bargaining or
leadership manuevering. It is possible that in some cases pre-floor bundling is used as a mechanism
of coalition maintenance, and that the resulting packages of bills are the products of intraparty
negotiations. Curry (2017), in a paper on majority party leadership’s use of self-executing rules in
the House, finds some support for this idea, demonstrating that self-executing amendments often
allow leaders “to take policy action they may not have been able to otherwise” (Curry 2017, pg.
23). Applying this to the bundling rules that are the focus of this chapter—many of which use
5Bussing & Treul (2021) make a similar argument, based partially on the fact that bringing contentious partisan
bills to the floor often necessitates the devotion of limited majority party leadership time and resources.
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self-executing amendments—we may expect that the individual components of the ultimate package
may not have the support to pass by themselves. In these cases, the majority party cohesion observed
on the floor is the product of intraparty deals enshrined in the package of bills.
3.4 Theoretical Expectations and Hypotheses
I conceive of pre-floor bundling as a balancing act performed by majority party leadership, in which
the imperative of partisan messaging to external audiences is balanced against the political needs and
policy preferences of individual majority party members. Of course, this construction implies that
these imperatives are sometimes conflicting—that the messaging needs of the party are occasionally
in tension with the political and policy demands of individual party legislators. Bundling bills
together at the Rules Committee stage can help to resolve this tension in three ways. First, bundling
reduces the number of party-line votes that cross-pressured members are asked to take on the floor.
Additionally, the construction of the legislative package itself may be a form of intraparty dealmaking
to accommodate majority party legislators’ diverse political needs and policy preferences. Lastly,
the relatively low public salience of the Rules Committee helps leaders to obscure parts of the
legislative package that might not have broad public appeal—but that are important to the attentive
policy demanders that are integral to the party coalition. This may help legislators escape direct
accountability for potentially unpopular policy moves while still allowing the party to collectively
reap credit from interest groups that are incentivized to pay close attention.
Following from this understanding of the logic behind pre-floor bundling, I provide a series of
hypotheses considering different steps of the legislative process. First, based on the assumption that
pre-floor bundling is important for partisan messaging to external audiences, I expect that contentious
partisan bills are more likely to end up in these packages than bills with bipartisan support.
• Hypothesis 1: Bills that are opposed by the minority party in committee are more likely to be
subject to pre-floor bundling.
Packaging bills together through an amendment made in order (or self-executed) by the Rules
Committee constitutes a considerable exertion of power by the majority party leadership. In certain
instances, Rules Committee amendments have taken bills reported by different standing commit-
tees and merged them together into one bill—a clear violation of the traditional understanding of
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committee jurisdictions. In fact, regardless of the invididual characteristics of the bills involved
in pre-floor bundling, the practice technically violates committee jurisdiction because no standing
committee is given the opportunity to consider the bill as a cohesive whole before it reaches the floor.
However, the requirement that special rules for consideration must be approved by a majority in the
House provides some theoretical constraints on the power that can be exercised by the majority party
contingent of the Rules Committee. To help ease some of the jurisdictional tensions that may be
provoked through the use of pre-floor bundling, I expect that bundled bills will be more likely to be
considered under a structured rule than a closed rule. A structured rule allows for the consideration
of certain pre-screened amendments on the floor, giving majority party leaders the ability to provide
some semi-choreographed deliberation without having to go through the messier process of putting
the combined bill through a full committee markup. Rank-and-file members may view the use of
a Rules Committee resolution to combine bills together and disallow all floor amendments to the
resulting package as an overreach of leadership power.
• Hypothesis 2: Bills that are the product of pre-floor bundling are more likely to be considered
under a structured rule than a closed rule.
If Hypothesis 1, which states that contentious partisan bills are more likely to become part of
legislative packages created in the Rules Committee, it follows that the resulting combined bills
would be more likely to receive party unity votes on the floor. Additionally, if these legislative
packages are designed with partisan messaging in mind—to demonstrate the party’s ideological
and policy commitments to certain external audiences—we would expect these bills to demonstrate
stark differences between the two parties on the floor. This hypothesis is particularly important
theoretically, because it pushes back against an alternative logic for pre-floor bundling—that these
legislative packages are designed in an attempt to forge bipartisan support.
• Hypothesis 3: Bills that are the product of pre-floor bundling are more likely to be the subject
of a party unity vote on the floor, relative to other bills that receive roll call votes.
My next hypothesis deals with the fate of bundled bills once they have reached the House floor. I
take it as a foregone conclusion that such bills, conditional on reaching the floor, will pass. However,
given that I expect little to no minority party support for these packages or for their component
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parts, I expect that such bills are less likely to become law than bills that were brought to the House
floor under more traditional procedures. If this hypothesis is confirmed, it would demonstrate that
conventional understandings of omnibus legislating, based on the assumption that the legislative
vehicle is destined to become law, cannot easily be applied to this new method of pre-floor bundling.
• Hypothesis 4: Bills that are the product of pre-floor bundling are less likely to become law
relative to other bills considered on the House floor.
My final hypothesis has to do with the sponsorship of the legislative packages that emerge from
the Rules Committee. Work on legislative effectiveness has demonstrated that committee chairs are
consistently highly effective at getting their bills to move through the legislative process (Volden &
Wiseman 2014). However, Adler & Wilkerson (2012), Casas et al. (2020), and others have argued that
these findings are driven by the well-established institutional mechanisms through which the chamber
conducts business, rather than by the individual characteristics or skills of any given committee chair
(but see Volden & Wiseman 2017). While I do not seek to fully adjudicate these differences in this
chapter, my data does allow me to test a relevant proposition—that committee chairs are uniquely
situated to take credit for collective work products. I hypothesize that, when bills are combined in
the Rules Committee, committee chairs are more likely than rank-and-file members to be the sponsor
of the vehicle bill that emerges.
• Hypothesis 5: Committee chairs are more likely than rank-and-file members to sponsor bills
that end up as the vehicle for pre-floor bundling.
3.5 Data
To test the above hypotheses, I collected data on all bills that were involved in combinations formed
by House Rules Committee resolutions from the 112th-114th Congress (2011-2017). To identify
these bills, I read all committee prints released by the House Rules committee during my period
of study. These committee prints are relevant because they contain the text of the bill as it will
be considered on the floor conditional on the passage of the special rule for consideration. Rules
Committee resolutions will often make reference to the text of a specific Rules Committee Print, as
in the following text, taken from a special rule for consideration of H.R. 2804, the Achieving Less
Excess in Regulation and Requiring Transparency (ALERRT) Act of 2014:
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After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute
rule. In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform now printed in the bill, it shall be
in order to consider as an original bill[...] an amendment in the nature of a substitute
consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 113-38.
Rules Committee Print 113-38 reads, in part:
Text of H.R. 2804[...] Showing the texts of H.R. 2804, as ordered reported by the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform; H.R. 2122 and H.R. 1493, as reported
by the Committee on the Judiciary; and H.R. 2542 as reported by the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Committee on Small Business.
Conditional on the passage of H. Res. 487, the version of H.R. 2804 that would be considered on
the floor would actually be the original text of H.R. 2804 plus the text of the three other bills listed in
the committee print above.
Reading all of the Rules Committee Prints from the 112th-114th Congresses yielded 28 “vehicle”
bills which, in all, contained the text of 126 different bills. For interested readers, all of these bills
are included in a table in Appendix C. Bundled bills frequently covered multiple different issue areas.
On average, each vehicle bill contained 1.8 issue topics as coded by the Policy Agendas Project
(Baumgartner & Jones 2013). Two vehicle bills spanned four different issue areas each, and five
other vehicle bills all spanned three different issue areas. One of these multi-issue bills, H.R. 4078,
was introduced as a six page bill that sought to enjoin all significant regulatory activity until the
unemployment rate fell below 6%. By the time the bill emerged from the Rules Committee it had
been combined with six other bills, spanned 92 pages, and encompassed domestic commerce, foreign
trade and environmental issues, in addition to its original topic code of government operations. While
this is an example of a relatively extreme transformation, cross-issue bundles were fairly common in
the data.
In order to test the hypotheses I have laid out above, I merged this collected data in with a
number of existing data sources. For Hypothesis 1, which posits that contentious partisan bills are
more likely to end up as part of these Rules Committee packages, I relied on the Congressional Bills
Project (Adler & Wilkerson 2014) for data on all bills introduced in the House during my period of
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study. To identify contentious partisan bills, I used an indicator variable from Bussing & Treul (2021)
for bills that were reported out of a House committee with minority or dissenting views attached to
the committee report.
To test Hypothesis 2, about the types of special rules for consideration assigned to bundled
bills, I used data on House Rules Committee resolutions made available by Lynch et al. (2020).
Data on roll call votes to test Hypothesis 3 come from the Political Institutions and Public Choice
(PIPC) Roll-Call Database (Crespin & Rohde 2019), while data on bill enactment for Hypothesis
4 also comes from the Congressional Bills Project (Adler & Wilkerson 2014). Finally, data on the
institutional status of bill sponsors necessary to test Hypothesis 5 come from the Center for Effective
Lawmaking (Volden & Wiseman 2014).
3.6 Results
My first hypothesis deals with the composition of legislative packages constructed in the Rules
Committee, and posits that contentious bills that split the two parties are more likely to be included
than bills with bipartisan support. To test this, I fit a logistic regression on a dataset of all House
bills that were given consideration in any standing committee from the 112th-114th Congresses. My
dependent variable in this model takes on a value of 1 if the bill ends up being part of a legislative
package constructed in the Rules Committee and a 0 otherwise. My primary independent variable of
interest is a dichotomous indicator for whether or not the committee report for each bill was the subject
of minority or dissenting views. Because minority or dissenting views document dissatisfaction
with the underlying legislation, this variable provides an indicator that the bill generated partisan
disagreement in committee (Fenno 1973, Bussing & Treul 2021).
I also include a number of control variables that may be related to the propensity for a bill to
be bundled in the Rules Committee. If these bills are used at least partially for partisan messaging
purposes, bills sponsored by majority party members should have a higher likelihood of being
included, so I include an indicator variable for majority party sponsored bills. I also include a
dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not each bill has a bipartisan cosponsorship coalition.
Following Harbridge (2015), if at least 20% of the bill’s cosponsors are from the minority party, that
bill is considered to have a bipartisan cosponsorship coalition. I am agnostic about the direction of
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the coefficient on this variable. If bills are included in these packages in order to try to win votes from
members of the minority party, it is possible that a bipartisan cosponsorship coalition may be seen
as a positive for majority party leaders. However, if such packages are purely partisan messaging
efforts, it is unlikely that bills with bipartisan support would be included.
I include an indicator variable for multiply-referred bills for two reasons. In his work on omnibus
legislating, Krutz (2001) argues that this form of legislating is an adaptive reaction by Congress to a
more complex policy environment. Because bills that are referred to multiple committees deal with
multiple different policy areas, or at least exist in some jurisdictional grey area, these bills may be
more likely to be included in legislative packages constructed by the Rules Committee. Additionally,
if these packages are constructed in order to help build a supportive coalition within the majority
party, multiply-referred bills may be prime candidates for inclusion. For example, bills that deal with
policy areas like the trading of derivatives, which is within the jurisdiction of both the Agriculture
Committee and the Financial Services Committee, may end up in compromise packages that include
bills reported from both committees. Lastly, I included a random effect for policy area, as the practice
of pre-floor bundling varies across issue area.
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Bipartisan Cosponsorship Coalition 0.148
(0.228)
Minority or Dissenting Views 2.359∗
(0.245)





Policy Area Random Effects Yes
Log Likelihood −380.892
∗p<0.05
Note: Coefficients are from a multilevel logistic regression with varying intercepts estimated by policy area.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The unit of analysis is a bill.
The results presented in Table 3.1 above demonstrate strong support for Hypothesis 1. Bills that
were the subject of partisan disagreement in committee are considerably more likely to be included
in packages constructed by the Rules Committee, controlling for other relevant factors.
Moving a step forward in the legislative process, Hypothesis 2 posits that bills that are the
product of pre-floor bundling are more likely to be considered under a structured rule than a closed
rule. Given that there are only 28 bundled bills during my period of study, hypothesis testing is
fairly straightforward in this instance. 21 of the 28 bundled bills were considered under structured
rules that allowed for pre-cleared amendments to be offered on the floor. Of the seven bills that
were considered under closed rules, five were reported out by the Ways and Means Committee—a
committee that is traditionally more likely to have its legislation considered under closed rules due
to the complex nature of tax policy under its jurisdiction (Fenno 1973, Smith & Deering 1984). In
general, then, it can be said that a large majority (75%) of the legislative packages that are created in
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the Rules Committee are considered under a structured rule on the floor. However, given the small
sample size, this trend should be interpreted with caution.
Another way to test Hypothesis 2 would be to fit a logistic regression using data on all bills that
received special rules for consideration, with the dichotomous dependent variable taking a value
of 1 if the bill was considered under a structured rule, and 0 otherwise. Technically what such a
model would be testing is the proposition that bundled bills are more likely to be considered under a
structured rule compared to all other bills that receive special rules for consideration. Table 3.2 below
reports the results of three simple logistic regression models. The first is a bivariate model with the
independent variable being an indicator for bundled bills which takes a value of 1 if the bill is a
legislative package constructed in the Rules Committee and 0 otherwise. The second model includes
a random effect for the primary referral committee for each bill, since the committee of jurisdiction
likely has an effect on the type of rule assigned to a bill. The third model adds an indicator for
multiply-referred bills to the multilevel structure of the second model. Multiply-referred bills may be
more likely to receive a structured rule on the floor because the jurisdictional overlap of such bills
will likely attract more interest in floor amendments.
Table 3.2: Estimating the Likelihood of Structured Rule Assignment
Dependent variable:
Structured Rule
Bivariate Model Cmtes. Model Mult. Ref. Control




Constant −0.032 0.231 −0.402
(0.103) (0.288) (0.388)
Observations 408 408 408
Primary Ref. Cmte. Random Effects No Yes Yes
Log Likelihood −279.094 −249.976 −246.966
∗p<0.05
Note: The first model is a bivariate logistic regression. The second and third models include a varying intercept
by primary referral committee. Logit coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses below.
The unit of analysis is a bill.
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In all three of these models, bundled bills are found to be positively associated with the as-
signment of a structured rule. These models further support Hypothesis 2, and provide suggestive
evidence that structured rules, as opposed to the more restrictive closed rules, may be offered as part
of an intraparty compromise to build support for the unorthodox use of Rules Committee resolutions
to package bills together.
Hypothesis 3 posits that legislative packages constructed in the Rules Committee are more likely
to receive a party unity vote on the floor compared to other bills that receive roll call votes. This
expectation is largely a reflection of the findings reported above (Table 3.1) that partisan bills are
more likely to become the components of these packages. The model reported in Table 3.3 below is
a logistic regression with the dichotomous dependent variable indicating the presence (1) or absence
(0) of a party unity vote on passage of each non-commemorative bill receiving a roll call vote. A
party unity vote is defined here, as per PIPC coding, as a vote on which at least 50% of one party
voted against at least 50% of the other party. The model includes a random effect for policy area,
taken from congress.gov, as the propensity for partisan disagreement likely varies by policy.
Table 3.3: Estimating the Likelihood of a Party Unity Vote on Non-Commemorative Legislation
Dependent variable:
Party Unity Vote









Policy Area Random Effects Yes
Log Likelihood −380.914
∗p<0.05
Note: Coefficients are from a multilevel logistic regression with varying intercepts estimated by policy area.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The unit of analysis is a bill.
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The primary independent variable of interest in the table above is the indicator for whether or not
a bill was part of a pre-floor combination made in the Rules Committee (Bundled Bill). Controlling
for whether the sponsor of the bill is a member of the majority party (Majority Party Sponsor) and
the extent of pre-floor bipartisan support for the bill (Bipartisan Cosponsorship Coalition), I find
that pre-floor bundling has a strong positive association with party unity votes on the floor. This
finding supports Hypothesis 3 and casts doubt on the proposition that these legislative packages are
constructed in an attempt to win over minority party support.
Hypothesis 4 deals with the fate of these bundled bills after they are voted on in the House—positing
that these bills are less likely to become law than bills that reached the floor through more traditional
procedures. Simply looking at the descriptive data, five of the 28 bundled bills ended up becoming
law, while the other 23 did not. This is a conversion rate of just over 17%, compared with a conversion
rate of nearly 34% for all H.R. bills that passed the House during my period of study.6
In order to more systematically test Hypothesis 4, I fit a logistic regression using data on all
House-sponsored H.R. bills that were considered on the House floor. My dependent variable in this
model is a dichotomous indicator for whether or not the bill became law. In order to account for
Congress- and policy-level heterogeneity in the underlying likelihood that any given bill will go on to
become law, I included a random effect for Congress and for policy area. In addition to my primary
independent variable of interest—Bundled Bill—I include a number of other controls that may be
associated with the likelihood that a bill becomes law. These are—an indicator for whether or not the
bill is commemorative in nature, an indicator for whether or not the bill is sponsored by a member
of the House majority party, an indicator for whether or not the bill has a bipartisan cosponsorship
coalition, and an indicator for whether or not the bill was the subject of minority or dissenting views
at the committee stage.
While the coefficient on the indicator for bundled bills is not statistically significant, it is
positive—which is unexpected in light of Hypothesis 4. Although we cannot definitively say that
these legislative packages are less likely to become law than other floor-considered bills, these
results demonstrate that they certainly are not more likely to become law. Even this qualified finding
suggests that this particular type of pre-floor bundling should be studied in a framework other than
6These rates are calculated by the author based on data made available by the Congressional Bills Project
(Adler & Wilkerson 2014).
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Majority Party Sponsor −0.234
(0.133)









Congress Random Effects Yes
Policy Area Random Effects Yes
Log Likelihood −1,001.525
∗p<0.05
Note: Coefficients are from a multilevel logistic regression with varying intercepts estimated by policy area
and Congress. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The unit of analysis is a bill.
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that developed for omnibus legislating, which is premised on an assumption that legislative vehicles
nearly always become law.
Finally, I test Hypothesis 5, which states that the bills that end up becoming the vehicles for these
legislative packages are more likely to be sponsored by committee chairs. To test this hypothesis,
I fit a logistic regression on all bills that became part of these legislative packages constructed in
the Rules Committee. The dependent variable in this model is an indicator of whether the bill was
selected as the vehicle, or the H.R. number under which the package was ultimately considered
on the floor. In addition to my primary independent variable of interest—an indicator for sponsor
committee chair status—I also include an indicator for subcommittee chair status, and a continuous
variable for sponsor seniority.














Note: Coefficients are from a logistic regression. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The unit
of analysis is a bill.
The results in Table 3.5 above do not demonstrate support for Hypothesis 5, as the coefficient on
the committee chair indicator is positive, but misses the traditional threshold for statistical significance
(p = 0.073). This finding raises questions about the basis upon which a vehicle bill is chosen. If
sponsorship of a vehicle bill is desirable from a credit claiming standpoint, it might be the case that
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the selection criteria has more to do with electoral need than with institutional position. Regardless,
given the prominence of legislative effectiveness measures that allocate credit for bill advancement
exclusively to the original sponsor of the bill (Volden & Wiseman 2014), it is important to work
towards a better understanding of who gets to claim sponsorship of combined measures.
3.7 Conclusion
The use of special rules for consideration from the House Rules Committee to combine different bills
together into one legislative package is a relatively recent development in congressional politics. In
this chapter, I provide a systematic analysis of the use of this unorthodox procedure, demonstrating
that it is used more as a partisan messaging tactic than as a strategy to enact favored policies into law.
Bills that pit the two parties against each other in committee are more likely to be included in these
legislative packages, which end up being more likely to garner a party unity vote when they move to
the floor. These contentious legislative packages are no more likely to become law than bills that
were brought to the House floor by themselves, which pushes back on the traditional logic ascribed
to omnibus legislating.
One normative concern about this procedure is that it reduces the opportunities for deliberation
in committee, since the legislative packages created in the Rules Committee are not able to be
considered by a committee of jurisdiction in their ultimate form. That is to say, while some of the
individual pieces of these legislative packages may have received committee consideration on their
own, the package as a whole was never considered by a substantive committee. This chapter provides
suggestive evidence that, in a tradeoff for this decrease of deliberative opportunity in committee, the
rules under which these packages are considered are more likely to allow pre-cleared amendments
on the floor.
While the use of special rules for consideration to bundle bills together certainly acts as a
time-saving mechanism for majority party leadership, it is unlikely that efficiency is the only relevant
concern motivating this procedural innovation. I posit that such rules are used strategically to reduce
the number of times that cross-pressured members of the majority party have to cast votes on partisan
priorities that may not be particularly popular in their districts. In addition to cutting down on the
sheer number of times members are asked to take tough votes for their party, the use of the less
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publicly salient Rules Committee to create these packages may help to obscure some of their less
popular components. Future work in this area should focus more closely and directly on the intraparty
bargaining, and the communications between party leaders and rank-and-file members, that go into
the pre-floor construction of these packages.
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CHAPTER 4: GATEKEEPING IN THE HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE
4.1 Introduction
The allocation of proposal rights in a legislative assembly has important implications for the internal
divisions of influence within the chamber, the content of the legislative agenda, and, ultimately, the
shape and thrust of public policy. While members in most legislatures are legally and constitutionally
equals, they collectively create institutions that establish and reinforce unequal distributions of
influence and power, affecting members’ ability to advance their preferred policy proposals. One
such institution, which has been the subject of much study within American politics, is the standing
committee.
The members of standing committees in the U.S. Congress are believed to exercise special
influence over issues within their policy jurisdictions, although the extent to which committees
operate autonomously in these areas is disputed. Specifically in the House of Representatives, which
is more procedurally-regimented than the Senate, the institutional bases of committee power are
rooted in proposal rights and gatekeeping rights. Neither of these sets of rights is inviolable, but
studying patterns in their use—conditions under which they are exerted or violated—helps to define
the boundaries of committee power.
For example, scholarly debates about the discharge petition (Pearson & Schickler 2009, Cox
& McCubbins 1993), a procedure by which a simple majority of legislators in the House can expel
a bill from a recalcitrant committee to the floor, focus on bottom-up constraints on committee
gatekeeping rights. Relatedly, studies that focus on committee bypass (Bendix 2016) or the extraction
of bills from committee pursuant to a special rule reported by the Rules Committee, demonstrate that
committee gatekeeping is also threatened by top-down, leadership-driven decisions. Jurisdictional
battles between committees seeking to expand their issue turf (King 1997), combined with the
strategic leadership use of multiple referrals, serve to limit any one committee’s exclusive claim
of influence over a policy area. Committee gatekeeping ability, then, seems to be besieged on all
sides—from the floor, from the majority party leadership, and from other committees.
Particularly in the modern era of partisan polarization, the lines between committee power and
party power can be quite blurred. Committee chairs who would seek to bottle up majority party
agenda items would not remain chairs for long—and legislators with preferences that are antithetical
to majority party priorities would find it nearly impossible to become a chair in the first place. But
while independent committee gatekeeping rights may be circumscribed—or even superfluous—in
this era, the same does not have to be true of committee proposal rights. In the language of cartel
theory, committees may no longer be able to exercise meaningful negative agenda power, independent
of the majority party leadership, but that does not inherently stop committee members from seeking
to use positive agenda power to advance preferred proposals.
The strongest form of committee proposal rights, or positive agenda power, would require the
chamber to consider any proposal reported out of committee as a take-it-or-leave-it offer versus the
status quo (Romer & Rosenthal 1978). Nothing like this exists in the current Congress, with the
possible exception of certain bills reported out of the Appropriations Committee, and a select handful
of other privileged resolutions.1 Typically, in order for a bill reported out of committee to receive
consideration on the floor, it would have to be assigned a special rule by the Rules Committee, or be
brought to the floor under the supermajoritarian suspension of the rules procedure. Effectively, then,
committee proposal rights are conditioned on the approval of other actors in the legislature.
In practice, the constraints on committee proposal rights may be exercised in both ex-ante and
ex-post manners. Ex-ante constraints—those largely based in the anticipated reactions of the floor
or the majority party leadership—may influence the behavior of committee members in ways that
would be nearly-imperceptible in large-N quantitative analyses of bill advancement data. However,
the exercise of ex-post constraints is much more easily observable. In this chapter, I examine ex-post
constraints on committee proposal power by analyzing decisions about whether or not to bring
committee-reported bills up for consideration on the floor. Using data from all House-sponsored bills
favorably reported by a House standing committee from the 104th–114th Congresses (1995-2017), I
1House Rule XIII, clause 5, allows the House Appropriations Committee to make a motion to bring appro-
priations bills to the floor without a special rule for consideration from the Rules Committee (Saturno et al.
2016).
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test a number of hypotheses about how sponsor, committee, and Congress-level variables affect the
likelihood of floor consideration.
My empirical strategy differs from much of the existing work on legislative organization, in that
I focus on the more general decision of whether or not to bring a reported bill to the floor, as opposed
to more specific decisions about special rule assignment (Krehbiel 1991, Sinclair 1994, Dion &
Huber 1996, Marshall 2002, Roberts 2010). For my purposes, focusing on special rule assignment
would effectively be selecting on the dependent variable, because, conditional on being assigned a
special rule, the bills in question are almost undoubtedly headed to the floor. Since I am interested in
ex-post constraints on committee proposal rights, I focus primarily on the more fundamental, and
presumably prior, decision about whether to assign a rule at all.
The chapter will proceed as follows. First, I describe the process by which committee-reported
legislation either reaches or fails to reach the House floor, reviewing the literature in this area
and focusing on change and continuity in this process across time. I then develop my theoretical
approach, and provide testable hypotheses. Next, I discuss my data on committee-reported bills
from the 104th–114th Congresses (1995-2017), and present descriptive data on House committee and
floor legislative activity during this period. I then move from descriptive data to an overview of my
empirical tests of the relationship between Congress, committee, sponsor, and bill-level factors and
the likelihood of floor consideration. After describing these tests, I present and discuss the results.
Finally, I conclude with a discussion that situates the findings of this chapter within the literatures on
legislative organization and agenda setting, and point out a number of avenues for future research.
4.2 Substantive Committees, the Rules Committee, and the Floor Agenda
When a committee favorably reports a bill, the members of that committee are recommending that
the bill be taken up for consideration on the floor.2 However, in the vast majority of cases, the report
itself does not technically compel the floor to take up the bill. Generally, after a committee reports a
bill, it must be assigned a special rule for consideration by the Rules Committee, or be brought to
the floor by either unanimous consent or the supermajoritarian suspension of the rules procedure.
2Of course, not all favorable committee reports are indicative of unanimous support among committee members.
Members have the opportunity to write up minority or dissenting views detailing their opposition to the
underlying legislation. Additionally, any roll call votes taken in committee are contained within the committee
report, and those votes often reveal disagreement between committee members.
70
Because a motion to suspend the rules requires a two-thirds supermajority vote, this procedure is
rarely used to consider legislation on which there is any substantial disagreement. Therefore, to be
considered on the floor, most major legislation must rely on a special rule for consideration reported
out of the Rules Committee and passed on the House floor. These special rules set the parameters for
consideration of the underlying legislation, including time limits on debate and which amendments,
if any, can be offered to the bill.
The House Rules Committee, then, is in a position to serve as a sort of upper-level gatekeeper
between substantive committees and the House floor. Given this rather important role, much
scholarship has focused on the extent to which the Rules Committee exercises its gatekeeping rights
as an agent of the majority party leadership, an agent of the floor, or as an independent entity. While
cartel theory (Cox & McCubbins 1993, 2005) holds that the Rules Committee unconditionally acts
as an agent of majority party leadership, Conditional Party Government theory (Rohde 1991, Aldrich
& Rohde 2001) posits that leadership control of the Rules Committee is conditional on the degree of
ideological homogeneity within the majority party, and the degree of polarization between the two
parties. On the other hand, Krehbiel’s informational theory, and particularly the remote majoritarian
principal, states that the Rules Committee—and all other committees—serve as agents of the floor
(Krehbiel 1991).
While the distributive theory of legislative organization (Weingast & Marshall 1988) does not
establish explicit expectations about the role of the Rules Committee, it has been interpreted to
suggest that the committee should assign restrictive rules to pork-barrel legislation to sustain inter-
committee logrolls. A voluminous literature has been devoted to empirically testing the propositions
of informational, partisan, and distributive theories of legislative organization by analyzing the
assignment of either restrictive or open rules to committee-reported legislation (Krehbiel 1991,
Sinclair 1994, Dion & Huber 1996, Marshall 2002, Schickler & Pearson 2009, Roberts 2010). A
full review of this literature is not necessary here, but one point in particular is worth emphasizing
to better contextualize the work being presented in this chapter. In various different ways, this
literature demonstrates that special attention needs to be paid to the broader political context in which
committees, parties, and legislators are interacting—both when conducting analyses of multiple
Congresses over time, and when conducting within-Congress analyses.
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For my purposes here, the broader political context refers to the majority party and chamber rules
governing committee assignment and service, the underlying preference distributions that sustain
those rules, and the issue area dynamics that are relevant to institutional and procedural choice. Rules
governing committee assignments and service have important implications for the extent to which
the Rules Committee should be expected to operate as an independent power base, an arm of the
majority party leadership, or an agent of the floor. However, even under similar sets of rules, the role
of the Rules Committee relative to the majority party can change as ideological homogeneity within
that party changes. Because changes in the underlying distribution of preferences across parties and
legislators are not automatically and immediately translated into rules changes, there is room for
a variety of different outcomes even as rules are held constant in the short term. Therefore, while
majority party rules changes that have increased the responsiveness of the Rules Committee, and
committees in general, to the preferences of the majority party are relevant to my analyses of recent
Congresses, I do not assume that they perfectly and unilaterally determine outcomes.
Another important source of variation in the agenda setting role of the Rules Committee is the
issue domain in which the substantive committee is operating. Even in polarized eras in which it
is relatively safe to assume that the Rules Committee is operating more or less as an arm of the
majority party leadership, rule assignment—or refusal to assign a rule—will likely vary based on
the policy content of the underlying bill. Rohde (1994) discusses the variation in issue domains
across substantive committees, and argues that the issue domain in which a committee operates has
important implications for institutional choices about the composition of that committee, and for
procedural choices about how the committee’s bills are brought to the floor. For example, he expects
that informational and distributive theories of legislative organization may be more apt in analyses of
committees that rarely deal with issues on which the two parties disagree (Rohde 1994, pg. 355).
When a committee frequently deals with partisan issues, on the other hand, majority party influence
is likely to be a significant influence on the internal operations of the committee, and in decisions
about how the committee’s bills are dealt with by the Rules Committee (Rohde 1994, pg. 356).
Considerations about issue domains, House and majority party rules, and the distribution of policy
preferences within and across parties are all important in considering questions about the agenda
setting role of the House Rules Committee. Accordingly, I seek to integrate these considerations
into my analyses that focus on one particular facet of Rules Committee agenda setting—selective
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gatekeeping of bills reported favorably by substantive committees. The next section lays out my
theoretical framework and expectations for these analyses.
4.3 Rules Committee Gatekeeping: A Theoretical Framework
In order to establish theoretical expectations for the exercise of gatekeeping rights by the Rules
Committee, I need to make explicit a number of fundamental assumptions about the relationship
between the Rules Committee and the majority party, as well as the goals pursued by the Rules
Committee in the rule assignment process. First, I assume that, during the time period I study (104th–
114th Congresses, 1995–2017), the Rules Committee acts as an agent of the majority party. During
this time period, the conditions for active majority party leadership—intraparty homogeneity and
interparty heterogeneity—are decidedly met.3 Additionally, the caucus rules for House Democrats
and the conference rules for House Republicans governing Rules Committee membership selection
make it doubtful that the committee is acting autonomously.
If the Rules Committee is in fact acting as an agent of the majority party, what goals are majority
party committee members pursuing in their agenda-setting capacity? Here I posit three general goals,
and explore the interactions between them. One of these goals is to achieve non-median policy
outcomes that are biased away from the floor median and towards the majority party median—and
conversely to prevent the consideration of bills that would move policy away from the majority party
median. Another goal is to facilitate the achievement of individual members’ policy goals, and the
broader governance goals of the party and the chamber, when doing so does not involve partisan
disagreement. And thirdly, the Rules Committee seeks to protect the collective electoral goals of the
majority party.
Two of these goals—achieving non-median policy outcomes and protecting the collective
electoral goals of the majority party, interact in non-obvious ways when it comes to their effect on
Rules Committee gatekeeping. The pursuit of non-median policy outcomes through the legislative
process can impose electoral costs on marginal majority party legislators representing districts that
lean towards the other party. Almost by definition, the passage of partisan legislation in the House
3While the conditions laid out by the Conditional Party Government theory are more or less uniformly met
during this time period, I do expect that Congress-to-Congress variations in these conditions have the potential
to affect Rules Committee gatekeeping.
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requires near-party-line votes, but legislators incur non-negligible electoral risks by casting these
votes (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002, Carson et al. 2010, Nyhan et al. 2012, Bussing et al. 2020). Work by
Lindstädt & Vander Wielen (2014), showing that majority party leaders are less likely to schedule
votes on partisan legislation as an election approaches, demonstrates that House agenda setters
strategically balance the pursuit of non-median policy with the electoral needs of majority party
members.
The House Rules committee can aid the majority party’s pursuit of non-median policy outcomes
by assigning restrictive rules to bills that seek to move policy towards the majority party median,
or by blocking bills that would seek to move policy away from the majority party median. The
assignment of restrictive rules can be costly to the majority party leadership, as their passage on
the floor requires the support of moderate majority party members who could achieve better policy
outcomes in expectation under an open rule (Jenkins & Monroe 2012a,b). As Bussing & Treul (2021)
argue, majority party leaders must be selective in deciding when to engage in the kind of intraparty
negotiations necessary to pass legislation without support from the minority party.
In contrast to the costs associated with pursuing non-median policies, the Rules Committee can
very easily facilitate the passage of legislation on which there is no substantial disagreement. In fact,
most of the time, the passage of such legislation requires no action from the Rules Committee, as
noncontroversial bills that are not the subject of partisan disagreement are often brought to the floor
under suspension of the rules.4 The efficient consideration of these bills facilitates the achievement
of both individual and chamber goals, and blocking such bills from the floor would likely prove
extremely unpopular.
While I assume that the Rules Committee can help the majority party to obtain non-median
outcomes, for the reasons outlined above, I expect that the committee will be more likely to close
4The Rules Committee actually can play some positive agenda setting role here, as special rules for consid-
eration can make it in order to consider bills under suspension of the rules on specified days. For example,
Section 2 of H. Res. 775 from the 113th Congress reads:
It shall be in order at any time on the legislative day of December 11, 2014, for the Speaker
to entertain motions that the House suspend the rules as though under clause 1 of rule XV.
The Speaker or his designee shall consult with the Minority Leader or her designee on the
designation of any matter for consideration pursuant to this section.
There are also examples of special rules for consideration that name specific bills which can be brought up
under suspension of the rules on a certain day.
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the gates for reported bills that may generate a party-line vote if they were to reach the floor. Of
course this is not an expectation that the Rules Committee will prevent any partisan legislation from
reaching the floor, but simply a statement that the committee must be more discerning and selective
when deciding which partisan proposals reach the floor. As will be discussed further below, I use the
presence or absence of minority or dissenting views in a committee report as a pre-floor indicator of
the partisan content of legislation. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is stated as follows:
• Hypothesis 1: Legislation reported out of committee with minority or dissenting views will be
less likely to receive floor consideration than less-divisive legislation.
Because I assume that one role of the Rules Committee, as an agent of the majority party,
is to help prevent policy from moving away from the majority party median, I expect that the
committee will be more likely to exercise its gatekeeping rights on bills that seek to do this. I settle
on two alternative specifications for measuring a bill’s ideological location—the first-dimension
DW-NOMINATE score of the median majority party legislator on the committee that reported the
bill, and the first-dimension DW-NOMINATE score of the bill’s sponsor. Since not all bills tap
into ideological differences between the two parties, regardless of the ideology of their sponsor or
reporting committee, I also specify hypotheses for interaction terms below. The negative effect of
ideological distance from the majority party median on the likelihood of floor consideration should
be exacerbated for partisan legislation.5 In regard to the committee-specific hypotheses, majority
party leaders can look to committee reports for information about how a bill is likely to fare on the
floor, and whether or not a bill would require leadership involvement. This information may be
helpful in deciding whether or not to bring a given bill to the floor. However, when bills are reported
by committees that are not particularly representative of the majority party on the floor, party leaders
may view these committee reports with a heightened degree of skepticism—particularly when they
contain minority or dissenting views. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are stated:
5Even though partisan legislation sponsored by a majority party member would likely be seeking to move
policy away from the floor median and towards the majority party median, the cost and difficulty of passing
such a proposal on the floor increases with the ideological distance between the bill’s sponsor (or reporting
committee) and the majority party median.
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• Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of floor consideration for reported legislation will decrease as
the ideological distance between the majority party contingent of the reporting committee and
the majority party floor median increases.
• Hypothesis 2a: The negative effect of the ideological distance between the majority party
contingent of the reporting committee and the majority party floor median will be larger for
legislation with minority or dissenting views.
• Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of floor consideration for reported legislation will decrease as
the ideological distance between the bill sponsor and the majority party median increases.
• Hypothesis 3a: The negative effect of the ideological distance between the bill sponsor and the
majority party floor median will be larger for legislation with minority or dissenting views.
Additionally, I test two Congress-level factors that I hypothesize may affect the gatekeeping role
of the Rules Committee in the House. First, I anticipate that the degree of majority party heterogeneity
should affect the likelihood of floor consideration for partisan legislation. Specifically, when partisan
majorities are more ideologically homogeneous, the Rules Committee should be more likely to bring
bills with minority or dissenting bills to the floor. However, as ideological homogeneity within the
majority party decreases, such bills should become less likely to receive consideration on the floor.
As discussed above, passage of partisan legislation entails electoral costs for certain majority party
members, as well as negotiation costs that are incurred by the party leadership. These costs should
be lower when the majority party is more homogeneous, and should increase as the party becomes
less cohesive. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 states:
• Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of floor consideration for legislation reported with minority
or dissenting views should decrease as the ideological homogeneity of the majority party
decreases.
Finally, I hypothesize that the patterns of floor consideration for committee-reported bills will
be different depending on whether the Republican or Democratic Party holds the majority in the
House. The House tends to be much more active in terms of the volume of legislation processed and
number of committee hearings held under Democratic leadership than under Republican leadership
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(Grossman & Hopkins 2016, ch. 6). This may be reflective of the ideological tendency of the
Democratic Party to seek to address social problems through government intervention, and the
countervailing tendency of the Republican Party to try to shrink the role of the federal government.
Tellingly, in 2013 John Boehner (R-OH), then serving as Speaker of the House, stated his belief in a
CBS interview that his Republican majority “should not be judged on how many new laws we create.
We ought to be judged on how many laws we repeal” (O’Brien 2013). While the refusal by the Rules
Committee to grant a special rule for consideration to a committee-reported bill is not equivalent to
repealing legislation, this gatekeeping behavior does certainly slow the legislative productivity of
the House. I expect that the Rules Committee will be more active in this gatekeeping role during
Republican majorities than during Democratic majorities. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 states:
• Hypothesis 5: Committee-reported legislation will be less likely to be given floor consideration
under Republican majorities than under Democratic majorities.
4.4 Descriptive Data
In this section, I review descriptive data on committee and floor activity from the 104th–114th
Congresses, emphasizing general patterns. Table 4.1, below, provides an overview of the volume of
committee reported legislation by Congress, and the frequency with which such legislation receives
floor consideration. The percentages in the far-right Floor Rate column demonstrate that a favorable
report by a standing committee does not guarantee floor consideration. Proposal rights of standing
committees, then, are clearly circumscribed during this period.
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Table 4.1: Floor Consideration Trends for Committee-Reported Bills
Bills Considered on Floor Bills Not Considered on Floor Floor Rate
104th Congress 395 95 81%
105th Congress 391 94 81%
106th Congress 448 139 76%
107th Congress 350 126 74%
108th Congress 347 141 73%
109th Congress 278 130 68%
110th Congress 515 103 83%
111th Congress 340 93 79%
112th Congress 305 175 64%
113th Congress 341 187 65%
114th Congress 497 204 71%
Note: This table only includes information on House-sponsored bills that were favorably reported from
committee. The ‘Floor Rate’ column shows the percentage of committee-reported bills that were given floor
consideration.
Another trend to note from Table 4.1 is that the Congresses during which committee-reported
bills were considered at the highest frequencies were those in which partisan control of the chamber
had switched hands. During the 104th and 105th Congresses (1995-1999), the first Republican-
majority Houses in 40 years, 81% of all bills that were reported favorably from committee received
consideration on the floor. This is only surpassed during my period of study in the 110th Congress,
when the Democratic Party took back the House majority, and 83% of all committee-reported
bills were considered on the floor. This pattern of elevated floor consideration rates, and therefore
decreased Rules Committee gatekeeping activity, after a change in partisan control points to the
fluctuating contextual salience of policy goals. It could be the case that majority party members on
the substantive committees and the Rules Committee are more likely to agree on policy when they
are seeking to overturn policy changes that occurred while they were in the minority.
The one conspicuous outlier to this trend is the 112th Congress (2011-2013), which saw the
Republicans retake the House majority in the 2010 midterm election. During this Congress, only 64%
of bills that were favorably reported out of committee made it to the House floor—the lowest observed
rate in the period of this study. The next Congress, during which Speaker Boehner expressed his hope
that his party would be judged more by its repealing efforts than by its legislative productivity, the
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floor consideration rate for committee-reported bills was 65%. The Rules Committee during this more
recent period of Republican majorities was declining to assign special rules for consideration to over
one-third of bills that were favorably reported by a substantive committee. This seemingly-enhanced
gatekeeping role is possibly reflective both of the ideological commitments of the Republican Party
to a more limited role for the federal government, and of an increasingly-prominent split within the
party between Tea Party conservatives and more establishment Republicans.
While the descriptive data in Table 4.1 is not sufficient to support or reject Hypothesis 5, about
the differences between Republican and Democratic majorities, it does provide suggestive evidence
that the Rules Committee is more likely to block committee-reported legislation when the House
is run by Republicans. With the exception of high rates of floor consideration during the 104th and
105th Congresses, the Rules Committee in almost all Republican majorities in the data blocks over a
quarter of committee-reported bills from the floor. However, given the variation that exists across
Congresses, as well as the importance of other considerations discussed in the previous section, it
may be informative to condition on other factors in multivariate analyses of the data.
4.4.1 Committee-Level Data
Different committees in the House deal with different types of policy issues and, partially as a function
of their different issue portfolios, have varying relationships with the majority party leadership. As
Rohde (1994) and Sinclair (1994) argue, majority party leadership is more likely to get involved
in committee business—and questions of how to handle reported legislation on the floor—when a
committee frequently deals with issues that are the subject of partisan disagreement. While party
leadership involvement may be evident in the reporting of restrictive rules from the Rules Committee
to protect partisan bills from amendment on the floor, leadership involvement also might be seen in
exercises of Rules Committee gatekeeping. As discussed above, the Rules Committee can help the
majority party to achieve non-median policy outcomes through the strategic assignment of restrictive
rules, but it also can perform a protective role with regard to members’ electoral prospects by keeping
some partisan bills from the floor.
Figure 4.1, below, shows the number of H.R. bills that each standing committee reported to the
floor in each Congress from the 104th–114th. The data here are restricted to bills that are only referred
to one committee, and excludes multiply-referred bills, in order to focus more exclusively on bill
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reports that can be attributed to only one committee. Reported bills are color-coded grey if they were
reported without minority or dissenting views attached, and black if they were reported with minority
or dissenting views attached. This categorization is meant to provide a sense of the proportion of a
given committee’s legislative agenda devoted to issues on which the two parties disagree.
Figure 4.1: Committee Reporting Activity, 104th–114th Congress
Science, Space, and Technology Small Business Transportation and Infrastructure Veterans Affairs Ways and Means
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Note: This figure was constructed using data collected by the author from congress.gov. Bills that were
referred to multiple committees are excluded from the figure.
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Figure 4.1 gives a sense of the variation that exists across committees both in volume of legislation
processed, and in the partisan content of legislation dealt with by each committee. For example,
the House Natural Resources committee regularly reports out over 100 bills per Congress, but the
vast majority of those bills deal with issues that do not provoke partisan disagreement. On the other
hand, the House Committee on Education and Labor deals with a much smaller legislative agenda,
but much of that agenda deals with partisan issues. Committees like Veterans’ Affairs, Agriculture,
Small Business, Foreign Affairs, and Science, Space, and Technology also have relatively small
legislative agendas, but almost never report out legislation on which the two parties disagree.
These systematic differences in the issue portfolios of substantive committees should be associ-
ated with different floor consideration rates for the bills reported by those committees. Figure 4.2
below depicts the bivariate relationship between the proportion of reported bills with minority or
dissenting views and the proportion of bills that are considered on the floor, by committee. Since the
unit of analysis here is a committee-Congress pair, this simple analysis cannot directly speak to bill-
level factors that may be associated with floor consideration. Therefore, this descriptive data cannot
support or reject Hypothesis 1, about the relationship between bill-level partisan disagreement and
floor consideration. However, it does provide suggestive evidence that the Rules Committee engages
in more discerning gatekeeping when dealing with bills reported by committees that frequently deal
with partisan issues.
81





0 25 50 75





























Reported Bills 40 80 120 160
Note: Dots represent committee-Congress pairs. Only committees that favorably reported at least 10 bills
to the floor in the course of a Congress are included. Dots are sized proportionally to the number of bills
reported by each committee in each Congress. The regression line, with 95% confidence intervals on either
side, is produced from a bivariate regression of the floor consideration rate for committee-reported bills on the
proportion of committee-reported bills with minority or dissenting views attached to the committee report.
Because my hypotheses deal with Congress-level, committee-level, bill-level, and sponsor-level
data, they can be more directly tested through multilevel regression on bill-level data. The descriptive
data presented in this section reveal suggestive relationships between key variables, but more rigorous
analyses is needed to fully test my hypotheses. The details of those analyses are covered in the next
section.
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4.5 Data and Methods
I consider a dataset of all H.R. bills that are favorably reported by House committees from the
104th–114th Congresses. The data are hierarchical in structure, with bills nested within sponsors,
committees, and Congresses. Because my hypotheses deal in some way or another with each of these
levels—and in some cases, with the interactions between them—I opt for a multilevel regression
approach. In all models presented below, the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of
whether or not a bill is given consideration on the House floor.6 Given the dichotomous nature of the
outcome of interest, the models presented below are logistic regression models. Unless otherwise
noted, all models include random effects for the primary committee to which the bill was referred, as
well as the Congress in which the bill was introduced.
4.5.1 Independent Variables
Because a number of my hypotheses deal with the partisan content of legislation, I need a measure
of whether or not a bill deals with an issue on which there is disagreement between the two parties.
Importantly, I cannot rely on floor votes to inform my choice, as my outcome of interest is whether
or not a bill is given consideration on the floor. While previous literature has inferred this bill-level
characteristic from information on each bill’s cosponsorship coalition (Harbridge 2015), I opt for
a more direct indicator—whether or not there were minority or dissenting views attached to the
committee report for the bill. This dichotomous indicator provides a pre-floor bill-level measure of
partisan disagreement.
Additionally, as mentioned above, Hypotheses 2, 2a, 3 and 3a leverage committee and sponsor
data in order to make inferences about bill-level information. In models presented below, I use
a committee-level ideological measure of the absolute distance between the first-dimension DW-
NOMINATE score of the median majority party member of the reporting committee and the first-
6It is important to note that this indicator is not a direct measure of whether or not a bill was assigned a special
rule for consideration from the Rules Committee, as committee-reported bills can be brought to the floor
under suspension of the rules. However, it is the case that every bill in my dataset that was assigned a special
rule for consideration was considered on the floor—although a small handful of these bills were pulled from
the floor without receiving a vote on passage. Therefore, at least in the data being analyzed here, being
assigned a special rule for consideration is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for receiving floor
consideration. I assume that bills that did not reach the floor failed to do so because they were not assigned a
special rule for consideration by the Rules Committee.
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dimension DW-NOMINATE score of the median member of the majority party on the floor.7 In
other models, I use a sponsor-level ideological measure of the absolute distance between the the first-
dimension DW-NOMINATE score of the bill sponsor and the the first-dimension DW-NOMINATE
score of the median member of the majority party on the floor. These variables provide alternative
methods of measuring the extent to which the bill in question seeks to move policy closer to or farther
from the majority party median.8 While these measures may be tapping into a similar concept as
the indicator that I use for partisan legislation, they provide information that is distinct from that
dichotomous measure. For example, a partisan bill sponsored by an ideologically extreme majority
party member would likely be treated differently by the Rules Committee than a noncontroversial
bill sponsored by the same member.
The Congress-level variables that I use to test Hypotheses 4 and 5 are fairly straightforward. The
majority party ideological dispersion measure that I use to test Hypothesis 4 is constructed by taking
the standard deviation of the first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores of all majority party members
in a given Congress. To test Hypothesis 5, I include a dichotomous indicator for Congresses with a
Democratic majority.9
I also include a number of other covariates that may be associated with the likelihood of floor
consideration for reported legislation. I include a dichotomous indicator of whether the bill is
commemorative in nature, as noncontroversial commemorative legislation which can be quickly
processed may be more likely to reach the floor.10 Additionally I include a Bipartisan Cosponsorship
Coalition indicator variable that is coded 1 if at least 20% of a bill’s original cosponsors are from
7The use of DW-NOMINATE scores here is potentially problematic. These scores are derived from the
roll call record, but if that record is strategically constructed based on the underlying preferences of party
members, as I argue here, then roll call based measures of ideology may be misleading. In the absence of
readily-available and obviously-superior measures of member ideology, however, I cautiously move ahead
with DW-NOMINATE—and note that tackling this endogeneity problem may be a fruitful avenue for future
measurement-oriented work.
8These measures are not perfect, as they rely on assumptions about the ideological location of the status
quo policy, which are difficult to verify. However, these ideological distance variables should still provide
meaningful information about how, or whether, reported bills are likely to be considered on the floor.
9This variable is equal to 1 for the 110th and 111th Congresses, and 0 for all other Congresses.
10Using the list provided in Volden & Wiseman (2014) as a starting place, I used a search for the following
words in bill descriptions given by the Congressional Bills Project (Adler & Wilkerson 2014) to identify
commemorative measures: commemorat-, commending, for the relief of, medal, posthumous, public holiday,
to designate, to encourage, to rename, to name, to redesignate, retention of the name, congratulat-, honoring,
recogniz-.
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the opposite party of the bill sponsor, and 0 otherwise. I borrow the 20% threshold from Harbridge
(2015), who uses the partisan composition of a bill’s cosponsorship coalition to identify bills that
have bipartisan support. Bipartisan support of legislation may indicate easy passage on the floor,
lack of electoral risk to members, and lack of necessity for majority party leadership involvement.
Therefore, such bills may have a higher baseline likelihood of being considered on the floor. Finally,
I include a (scaled) continuous variable of the number of days left in the meeting of Congress after
the bill was reported from committee. If time is a factor in Rules Committee decisions to send
committee-reported legislation to the floor, I want to account for variation in floor consideration
that may be attributable to time concerns. Finally, I include an indicator for whether or not the bill
sponsor is a member of the majority party.
4.6 Results
Table 4.2 below presents the results of models designed to test Hypotheses 1–3a. To review,
Hypothesis 1 posits that bills reported out of committee with minority or dissenting views are less
likely to be considered on the floor. Hypothesis 2 states that bills reported by committees that
are less representative of the majority party will also be less likely to be given consideration on
the floor, and Hypothesis 2a states that the negative committee-level effect will be accentuated for
partisan legislation reported with minority or dissenting views. Finally, Hypothesis 3 holds that the
likelihood of floor consideration will decrease as a function of the ideological distance between the
bill sponsor and the majority party median, and Hypothesis 3a posits that this sponsor-level effect
will be accentuated for partisan legisation reported with minority or dissenting views.
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Table 4.2: Estimating the Likelihood of Floor Consideration for Reported Bills
Dependent variable:
Floor Consideration
Hyp. 1 Hyp. 2 Hyp. 2a Hyp. 3 Hyp. 3a
Minority or Dissenting Views −1.211∗ −1.423∗ −1.233∗ −1.215∗ −1.052∗
(0.079) (0.094) (0.158) (0.079) (0.105)
Abs. Dist. (Cmte. Maj. Median - Floor Maj. Median) 0.974 2.237
(1.487) (1.719)
Minority or Dissenting Views X −3.792
Abs. Dist. (Cmte. Maj. Median - Floor Maj. Median) (2.547)
Abs. Dist. (Sponsor - Floor Maj. Median) −0.281 0.0001
(0.338) (0.359)
Minority or Dissenting Views X −1.185∗
Abs. Dist. (Sponsor - Floor Maj. Median) (0.506)
Bipartisan Cosponsorship Coalition 0.043 0.040 0.038 0.042 0.052
(0.080) (0.097) (0.097) (0.081) (0.081)
Majority Party Sponsor 0.134 0.130 0.135 −0.087 0.061
(0.093) (0.106) (0.106) (0.248) (0.256)
Days Left in Congress (Scaled) 0.512∗ 0.518∗ 0.517∗ 0.515∗ 0.515∗
(0.034) (0.041) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035)
Commemorative Bill 0.492∗ 0.300 0.303 0.501∗ 0.489∗
(0.206) (0.222) (0.222) (0.208) (0.208)
Constant 1.402∗ 1.683∗ 1.615∗ 1.661∗ 1.460∗
(0.175) (0.226) (0.229) (0.324) (0.335)
Congress-Level Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Committee-Level Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,684 4,558 4,558 5,582 5,582
Log Likelihood −2,939.843 −2,162.523 −2,161.417 −2,884.731 −2,881.916
∗p<0.05
Note: The columns of this table present coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions with varying intercepts
estimated at the committee and Congress level. Standard errors are listed below the coefficients in parentheses.
The unit of analysis for all models is a bill. The N = 5, 684 for the model in the first column includes the
entire bill-level dataset. The N = 4, 558 for the second and third models only includes single-referral bills.
Multiple-referral bills are excluded from these models because of the inclusion of a committee-level covariate.
These models seek to estimate the effect of relative committee ideology on the likelihood of floor consideration
for committee-reported bills, so it is important to focus on bills that are reported by only one committee. The
N = 5, 582 in the fourth and fifth columns represents the loss of bills sponsored by territorial delegates, who
do not have DW-NOMINATE scores.
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The models above demonstrate strong support for Hypothesis 1.11 The coefficient on the Minority
or Dissenting Views indicator variable is negative and statistically significant in the model in the first
column, meant to directly test the hypothesis, as well as in all other models. This finding suggests
that much of Rules Committee gatekeeping functions to keep contentious partisan legislation off
the floor. While this may seem counterproductive to the assumed goal of helping the majority party
achieve non-median policy outcomes, it is in line with an electorally-oriented strategy that seeks to
protect members from too frequently having to take potentially risky party line votes. Additionally,
this gatekeeping strategy may be reflective of constraints on the capacity of majority leadership to
engage in pre-floor intraparty negotiations. During the modern era I study, majority party leaders
hold some degree of delegated authority to exercise positive agenda power—but there are limits on
that authority. The Rules Committee, then, may selectively usher some partisan bills to the floor
when party leaders are willing and able to work for their passage, but more frequently screen such
legislation from reaching the floor.
Hypotheses 2 and 2a are not supported by the results presented above. Looking at the second
model in Table 4.2 (Hyp. 2), the coefficient on the reporting committee ideological distance measure
is not in the expected direction, although it is also not statistically significant. In the third model
(Hyp. 2a), the coefficient on the interaction term between Minority or Dissenting Views and the
committee ideological distance measure is in the expected direction, but does not attain statistical
significance. Hypotheses 2 and 2a were premised on the idea that the Rules Committee may view
favorable committee reports with heightened scrutiny when they came from committees that were
not particularly representative of the majority party. Based on the evidence from the two models
discussed, there is not a strong basis of support for these hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3, which expects that the likelihood of floor consideration is decreasing as a function
of the ideological distance between the bill sponsor and the majority party median, is not supported
11Given the fluctuations of floor consideration rates across Congresses evident in Table 4.1 above, as well as
my expectations about differences between Republican and Democratic majorities, I test Hypotheses 1–3a
on different subsets of the data in Appendix D. I test each hypothesis separately on Democratic majorities
(110th and 111th Congresses), all Republican majorities (104th–109th and 112th–114th Congresses, pooled),
and the earlier (104th–109th Congresses) and later (112th–114th Congresses) Republican majorities. The
results are substantively similar, with some interesting differences. For example, a model fit on data from
the Democratic majorities (110th and 111th Congresses) found support for Hypothesis 2a, and the support
for Hypotheses 3 and 3a seem to be largely driven by Republican majorities. All results can be found in
Appendix D.
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by the fourth model in Table 4.2 (Hyp. 3). While the coefficient on the variable for sponsor ide-
ological distance is in the expected negative direction, it is not statistically signifcant. However,
Hypothesis 3a, which states that the expected negative effect of sponsor ideological distance on
the likelihood of floor consideration should be stronger for partisan legislation, is supported by the
results of the fifth model (Hyp. 3a). The coefficient on the interaction term between the Minority or
Dissenting Views indicator and the sponsor ideological distance measure is negative and statistically
significant. The plot in Figure 4.3 below depicts this interaction effect, with a rugplot on the x-axis
showing the density of bill sponsors across the relative ideological distance dimension. The interac-
tion plot demonstrates that the ideological distance between a bill sponsor and the majority party
median negatively affects the likelihood of floor consideration for bills reported out with minority
or dissenting views, but does not affect the likelihood of floor consideration for non-controversial bills.
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Hypotheses 4 and 5, which both deal with Congress-level variables, are tested in models pre-
sented in Table 4.3 below. The first model in Table 4.3 (Hyp. 4) tests Hypothesis 4 by including
an interaction term between the variable measuring the ideological dispersion of the majority party
in each Congress and the bill-level Minority or Dissenting Views indicator. The results of this
model provide support for Hypothesis 4, as the coefficient on the interaction effect is negative and
statistically signifcant. This suggests that partisan bills are less likely to be brought to the floor during
Congresses in which the majority party is relatively ideologically heterogeneous. While congres-
sional parties in the House are generally characterized by high levels of ideological homogeneity in
the period of my study, this finding suggests that even small variations in ideological homogeneity
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may be relevant in decisions about whether to bring partisan legislation to the floor.




Hyp. 4 Hyp. 5
Minority or Dissenting Views −1.181∗ −1.208∗
(0.080) (0.079)
Maj. Party Ideological Dispersion (Scaled) 0.020
(0.092)
Minority or Dissenting Views X −0.221∗
Maj. Party Ideological Dispersion (Scaled) (0.080)
Democratic Majority 0.363
(110th & 111th Congresses) (0.189)
Bipartisan Cosponsorship Coalition 0.044 0.049
(0.080) (0.080)
Majority Party Sponsor 0.138 0.134
(0.093) (0.093)
Days Left in Congress 0.516∗ 0.511∗
(0.035) (0.034)




Congress-Level Random Effects Yes Yes
Committee-Level Random Effects Yes Yes
Observations 5,684 5,684
Log Likelihood −2,935.891 −2,938.265
∗p<0.05
Note: The columns of this table present coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions with varying intercepts
estimated at the committee and Congress level. Standard errors are listed below the coefficients in parentheses.
The unit of analysis for all models is a bill.
The plot in Figure 4.4 below depicts the interaction from the Hyp. 4 model in Table 4.3. The
majority party ideological dispersion variable is measured as the standard deviation of the first-
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dimension DW-NOMINATE scores of the majority party members in each Congress, such that
lower values indicate more homogeneity and higher values indicate more dispersion. The variable is
scaled in the plot below, with negative numbers indicating the Congresses in which majority parties
were more homogeneous than average, and positive numbers indicating the Congresses in which
majority parties were more dispersed than average. The rugplot on the x-axis shows the location of
each Congress on the majority party dispersion dimension. The Democratic majority in the 110th
Congress (2007-2009) is on the far left of the plot as the most homogeneous majority party, while
the Republican majority in the 104th Congress is on the far right of the plot as the least homogeneous
majority party.
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The results of the second model (Hyp. 5) in Table 4.3, above, do not provide strong support
for Hypothesis 5, which posited that Congresses with Democratic majorities would see committee-
reported legislation brought to the floor at higher rates than Congresses with Republican majorities.
The hypothesis was tested by including an indicator variable for Congresses with Democratic
majorities, and while the coefficient on this variable is in the expected positive direction, it narrowly
misses traditional levels of statistical significance (p = 0.055).
4.7 Conclusion
The analyses presented in this chapter provide insights into the gatekeeping role of the House Rules
Committee. I find that partisan bills, rather than always being ushered to the floor under restrictive
rules, are more likely to be held back from floor consideration than bills with bipartisan support.
Additionally, I find that the likelihood of floor consideration for partisan bills is decreasing as a
function of the ideological distance between the bill sponsor and the majority party median. This
particular finding suggests two interesting explanations, which may not be mutually exclusive. The
first is that the Rules Committee refuses to grant rules for consideration to bills that would move
policy away from the majority party median. The second is that the committee gatekeeps some
bills that would move policy towards the majority party median, because floor votes on those bills
would be electorally risky for some majority party members, or impose excessive transaction costs
on majority party leaders seeking to build the coalition for passage.
I also demonstrate that the likelihood of floor consideration for partisan legislation is increasing
as a function of majority party ideological homogeneity. While the range of this variable is fairly
restricted in the 11 Congresses I study, this finding suggests that even small variations in majority
party cohesion can be relevant to decisions about which bills to bring to the floor. Future work in this
area could extend the data back in time in order to encompass much more variation in the degree of
majority party ideological homogeneity. This may also be a fruitful direction for determining how
variation in intraparty homogeneity and interparty heterogeneity affect Rules Committee gatekeeping.
I devote the remainder of this conclusion section to the discussion of a lingering theoretical
question about committee-reported legislation that is not considered on the floor. Across the time
period I study, over a quarter of all bills that were favorably reported by House committees were
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never taken up on the House floor. Without historical baselines, it is impossible to say whether this
is a particularly high or low rate of floor consideration for committee-reported bills. However, it
does suggest a certain level of inefficiency in the legislative process of the House. If substantive
committees and the Rules Committee all operate as agents of an ideologically homogeneous majority
party, what can account for the occurrence of favorably reported bills being kept from the floor?
One likely explanation is that legislators have imperfect information about the preferences of
their colleagues (Cameron 2000). Legislation may be reported out of a committee based on the
chair’s belief that it will be brought to the floor. However, in some cases this belief may be incorrect,
and the legislation—reported based on the chair’s mistaken assumption that it would be considered
and passed on the floor—never makes it there.
Another possible explanation is that bills are reported out of committee without regard to whether
or not they will be considered on the floor. Committee chairs and other committee members may
benefit from position-taking on reported legislation, even if that legislation is never considered
on the floor. However, the suggestion that there are majority party members who would benefit
from position-taking on bills that the party leadership would prefer to keep from the floor implies
some degree of preference heterogeneity within the party. Under this framework, the gatekeeping
capacity of the Rules Committee protects the collective reputation of the majority party by screening
unrepresentative legislative proposals from the floor. At the same time, it allows the legislators who
would sponsor such unrepresentative proposals—and the committee members who would report
them—the opportunity to burnish their individual reputations without tarnishing the party’s.
However, this particular equilibrium is only stable given certain assumptions about members’
motivations. The hypothetical legislators I have described above, content to work on perpetually-
doomed legislation outside the mainstream of their party, could be characterized as single-minded
seekers of reelection, hewing to the maxim that “the electoral payment is for positions, not for effects”
(Mayhew 1974, pg. 146). On the other hand, if members are also motivated to make good public
policy (Fenno 1973), they may not acquiesce for long to a Rules Committee that keeps their policy
proposals from the House floor.
The occurrence of Rules Committee gatekeeping suggests a certain level disagreement within the
majority party, over policies, priorities, or both. Gatekeeping itself can suppress these disagreements
by preventing them from reaching the House floor—thereby perpetuating an external perception of
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party cohesion. But how can political scientists and congressional observers determine the extent to
which the cohesion of the majority party is genuine, and how much of it is manufactured through
strategic pre-floor agenda setting? This is an important and vexing question, because the ability
of the majority party leadership to engage in strategic pre-floor agenda setting is premised upon a
certain degree of party cohesion. Therefore, majority party cohesion both produces and is produced
by leadership-driven agenda setting processes such as Rules Committee gatekeeping. Future work
should seek to resolve this tautology in order to better understand intraparty dynamics in a polarized
era.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND COMMEMORATIVE BILL CODING,
CH. 2
A.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Suspension Bills 7,707 1.253 2.118 0 0 2 24
Previous Vote Share (Scaled) 7,707 0.004 0.976 −1.592 −0.783 0.653 3.337
Seniority (Scaled) 7,707 −0.028 0.987 −1.048 −0.803 0.423 6.063
Bills Introduced (Scaled) 7,707 0.015 1.009 −0.939 −0.550 0.227 13.388
Percent Restrictive Rules (Scaled) 7,707 0.004 1.007 −1.631 −0.545 0.504 2.185
Margin of Control (Scaled) 7,707 −0.002 1.001 −1.325 −0.862 0.527 2.008
Tot. Bills Passed by Non-Susp. Routes (Scaled) 7,707 −0.003 1.007 −1.392 −0.582 0.386 2.146
Tot. Bills Considered (Scaled) 7,707 −0.014 1.005 −1.544 −0.521 0.434 2.667
A.2 Words Used to Identify Commemorative Bills
Using the list provided in Volden & Wiseman (2014) as a starting place, I used a search for the
following words in bill descriptions given by the Congressional Bills Project (Adler & Wilkerson
2014) to identify commemorative measures:
commemorat-, commending, for the relief of, medal, posthumous, public holiday, to designate,
to encourage, to rename, to name, to redesignate, retention of the name, congratulat-, honoring,
recogniz-
APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX, CH. 2
B.1 Supplemental Appendix
Table 1 below reports results of robustness check models, which include three independent variables
not included in the models presented in the main paper. The first of these (Total Non-Commemorative
Chair-Sponsored Suspension Measures) is a structural control variable helpfully suggested by an
anonymous reviewer. I mention in the paper that “[it] is also likely that many of the chair-sponsored
measures considered under suspension are important reauthorization bills that they have marked up
within their committee.” In an attempt to control for the effect of this particular use of suspension of
the rules on the dependent variable, I attempted to create a Congress-level variable that measures
the number of major chair-sponsored reauthorization bills considered under suspension of the
rules in each Congress. Unable to directly identify all reauthorization bills,1 I created the Total
Non-Commemorative Chair-Sponsored Suspension Measures by collapsing the number of non-
commemorative bills that were sponsored by committee chairs, reported by a House committee
(ReportH == 1 in the Congressional Bills Project data), and referred to the committee chaired by the
bill’s sponsor (ChRef == 1 in the Congressional Bills Project data) per Congress.
The results in Table 1 below also include two additional variables based on work by Jenkins
& Monroe (2012a,b), and used in suspension-specific work by Moffett (2016). These variables
are indicators for a bill sponsor’s location in two distinct zones of ideological space based on their
DW-NOMINATE score—Between 30% Zone and Maj. Party Median, and Between Maj. Party
Median and 2M − F . A discussion of these variables, and the rationale for their exclusion from the
main models presented in the paper, can be found in footnote 19 of the article.
The models presented in the article are fit with scaled versions of the continuous independent
variables. Table 2 below presents the results of the models fit with unscaled independent variables.
Table 3 presents the results of models fit separately on commemorative and non-commemorative
bills. The first two columns of Table 3 are the models used to create Figure 2.9 in Chapter 2.
1One issue I ran into was the difficulty of identifiying reauthorization bills. There is no variable in the
Congressional Bills Project data that allows me to identify these bills, and due to variation in naming
conventions, it is not always the case that such bills have “reauthorization” in their titles. For example, farm
bills reauthorize many programs, but rarely, if ever, include the word reauthorization in their titles.
Table B.1: Predicted Count of Suspension Measures by Member (Robustness Check)
Dependent variable:
Suspension Measures (Count)
Maj. Party Min. Party Pooled Int.
Percent Restrictive Rules 0.041 −0.048 −0.025 −0.023
(0.092) (0.106) (0.100) (0.098)
Margin of Control −0.122 −0.196∗ −0.186∗ −0.180∗
(0.068) (0.069) (0.064) (0.063)
Total Bills Passed by Non-Suspension Routes −0.729∗ −0.649∗ −0.693∗ −0.692∗
(0.114) (0.117) (0.111) (0.109)
Total Bills Considered 0.507∗ 0.315∗ 0.378∗ 0.384∗
(0.052) (0.061) (0.058) (0.056)
Total Non-Commemorative Chair-Sponsored Suspension Measures 0.088 0.202∗ 0.181∗ 0.181∗
(0.059) (0.063) (0.060) (0.059)
Previous Vote Share 0.121∗ 0.003 0.016 0.085∗
(0.033) (0.022) (0.018) (0.029)
Seniority 0.012 0.008 0.025 0.023
(0.032) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020)
Bill Introductions 0.313∗ 0.329∗ 0.338∗ 0.337∗
(0.038) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Cmte. Chair 0.861∗ 0.822∗ 0.838∗
(0.064) (0.059) (0.060)
Subcmte. Chair 0.491∗ 0.480∗ 0.489∗
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039)
Moderate Majority −0.033 −0.098 −0.134
(0.087) (0.084) (0.084)
30% Zone 0.021 −0.032 −0.071
(0.077) (0.073) (0.074)
Between 30% Zone and Maj. Party Median −0.011 −0.027 −0.061
(0.076) (0.073) (0.074)
Between Maj. Party Median and 2M − F 0.052 0.042 0.027
(0.064) (0.062) (0.062)
Majority Party Member 0.623∗ 0.647∗
(0.065) (0.065)
Previous Vote Share X Majority Party Member −0.102∗
(0.033)
Constant −1.052∗ −0.227∗ −0.857∗ −0.861∗
(0.054) (0.078) (0.052) (0.051)
Sponsor Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Congress Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,437 4,270 7,707 7,707
Log Likelihood −3,194.692 −6,606.308 −9,823.734 −9,819.079
∗p<0.05
Note: Coefficients are from multilevel negative binomial models with varying intercepts estimated by bill
sponsor and Congress. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The unit of analysis is a member-
Congress.
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Table B.2: Predicted Count of Suspension Measures by Member with Unscaled Independent Variables
Dependent variable:
Suspension Measures (Count)
Minority Sponsors Majority Sponsors Pooled Model Interaction
Percent Restrictive Rules 0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Margin of Control −-0.003 −0.005∗ −0.005∗ −0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Tot. Bills Passed by Non-Susp. Routes −-0.004∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Tot. Bills Considered 0.002∗ 0.001∗ 0.002∗ 0.001∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tot. Non-Comm. Chair-Sponsored Susp. Measures 0.007 0.016∗ 0.011∗ 0.015∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Previous Vote Share 0.013∗ 0.0003 −0.0001 0.009∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Seniority 0.005 0.001 0.013∗ 0.005
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Bill Introductions 0.018∗ 0.018∗ 0.019∗ 0.337∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cmte. Chair 0.867∗ 2.587∗ 0.844∗
(0.065) (0.102) (0.060)
Subcmte. Chair 0.495∗ 0.582∗ 0.493∗
(0.041) (0.057) (0.039)
Moderate Majority −0.032 −-0.138 −0.132
(0.087) (0.121) (0.085)
30% Zone 0.022 −0.057 −0.071
(0.077) (0.108) (0.074)
Between 30% Zone and Maj. Party Median −0.011 −0.231∗∗ −0.060
(0.077) (0.108) (0.074)
Between Maj. Party Median and 2M − F 0.053 −0.030 0.027
(0.064) (0.093) (0.062)
Majority Party Member 0.820∗ 1.358∗
(0.094) (0.246)
Previous Vote Share X Majority Party Member −0.011∗
(0.004)
Constant −2.062∗ −0.062 −0.049 −1.426∗
(0.515) (0.513) (0.351) (0.499)
Sponsor Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Congress Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,437 4,270 7,707 7,707
Log Likelihood −3,192.7 −6,609.2 −14,714.5 −9,822.0
∗p<0.05
Note: Coefficients are from multilevel negative binomial models with varying intercepts estimated by bill
sponsor and Congress. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The unit of analysis is a member-
Congress.
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Table B.3: Predicted Counts of Commemorative and Non-Comemmorative Measures
Dependent variable: Suspension Measures (Count)
Pooled (Comm.) Pooled (Non-Comm.) Int. (Comm.) Int. (Non-Comm.)
Percent Restrictive Rules −0.222 −0.052 −0.218 −0.051
(0.171) (0.113) (0.166) (0.112)
Margin of Control −0.304∗ −0.075 −0.292∗ −0.072
(0.118) (0.071) (0.115) (0.070)
Tot. Bills Passed by Non-Susp. Routes −1.344∗ −0.553∗ −1.335∗ −0.552∗
(0.216) (0.128) (0.211) (0.127)
Total Bills Considered 0.680∗ 0.344∗ 0.691∗ 0.347∗
(0.095) (0.063) (0.092) (0.063)
Previous Vote Share 0.036 0.012 0.139∗ 0.045
(0.030) (0.021) (0.042) (0.035)
Seniority −0.059 0.065∗ −0.059 0.064∗
(0.032) (0.022) (0.032) (0.022)
Bill Introductions (Comm.) 0.302∗ 0.296∗
(0.021) (0.021)
Bill Introductions (Non-Comm.) 0.342∗ 0.342∗
(0.019) (0.019)
Cmte. Chair 0.575∗ 0.844∗ 0.619∗ 0.851∗
(0.110) (0.065) (0.111) (0.065)
Subcmte. Chair 0.091 0.543∗ 0.113 0.547∗
(0.068) (0.043) (0.069) (0.043)
Moderate Majority −0.106 −0.103 −0.162 −0.111
(0.118) (0.076) (0.119) (0.076)
30% Zone 0.122 −0.093 0.076 −0.101
(0.082) (0.058) (0.083) (0.059)
Majority Party Member 0.272∗ 0.832∗ 0.289∗ 0.834∗
(0.062) (0.047) (0.062) (0.047)
Prev. Vote Share X Maj. Party Member −0.177∗ −0.046
(0.052) (0.039)
Constant −2.340∗ −1.317∗ −2.346∗ −1.318∗
(0.092) (0.061) (0.090) (0.061)
Sponsor Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Congress Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,707 7,707 7,707 7,707
Log Likelihood −4,243.211 −8,545.859 −4,237.444 −8,545.187
Akaike Inf. Crit. 8,518.423 17,123.720 8,508.888 17,124.370
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 8,629.621 17,234.920 8,627.036 17,242.520
∗p<0.05
Note: Coefficients are from multilevel negative binomial models with varying intercepts estimated by bill
sponsor and Congress. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The unit of analysis is a member-
Congress.
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF BUNDLED BILLS, CH. 3
Table C.1: Bundled House Bills, 112th–114th Congresses
Vehicle Bill Hitchhiker Bill(s) Reporting Committees
112-HR-2578 112-HR-2352 Natural Resources
(Conservation and Economic Growth Act) 112-HR-460









112-HR-3409 112-HR-910 Natural Resources
(Stop the War on Coal Act of 2012) 112-HR-2401 Energy and Commerce
Bill Johnson (R-OH) 112-HR-2273 Transportation and Infrastructure
112-HR-2018
112-HR-3606 112-HR-2930 Financial Services
(Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act) 112-HR-2940
Stephen Fincher (R-TN) 112-HR-1070
112-HR-2167
112-HR-4078 112-HR-2308 Financial Services
(Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Job Creation Act) 112-HR-373 Judiciary




112-HR-4480 112-HR-4383 Energy and Commerce
(Domestic Energy and Jobs Act) 112-HR-4382 Natural Resources
Cory Gardner (R-CO) 112-HR-4381
112-HR-2752
Continuation of Table C.1




(Protecting Access to Healthcare Act) Energy and Commerce
Phil Gingrey (R-GA) Ways and Means
112-HR-6156 112-HR-4405 Ways and Means
(The Magnitsky Act of 2012)
Dave Camp (R-MI)
113-HR-2279 113-HR-2318 Energy and Commerce
(Reducing Excessive Dealine Obligations Act of 2013) 113-HR-2226
Cory Garder (R-CO)
113-HR-2728 113-HR-2850 Natural Resources
(Protecting States’ Rights to Promote American Energy Security Act) Science, Space, and Technology
Bill Flores (R-TX)
113-HR-2804 113-HR-1493 Oversight and Government Reform
(ALERRT Act of 2014) 113-HR-2542 Judiciary
George Holding (R-NC) 113-HR-2122 Small Business
113-HR-2954 113-HR-585 Natural Resources
(Public Access and Lands Improvement Act) 113-HR-2095







113-HR-3193 113-HR-3519 Financial Services
(Consumer Financial Freedom and Washington Accountability Act) 113-HR-2385
Sean Duffy (R-WI) 113-HR-2571
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Continuation of Table C.1
Vehicle Bill Hitchhiker Bill(s) Reporting Committees
113-HR-2446
113-HR-4315 113-HR-4317 Natural Resources
(Endangered Species Transparency and Reasonableness Act) 113-HR-4316
Doc Hastings (R-WA) 113-HR-4318
113-HR-4413 113-HR-1256 Agriculture
(Customer Protection and End User Relief Act) 113-HR-1003 Financial Services
Frank Lucas (R-OK) 113-HR-742
113-HR-634
113-HR-677
113-HR-4453 113-HR-4454 Ways and Means
(S Corporation Permanent Tax Relief Act of 2014)
David Reichert (R-WA)
113-HR-4719 113-HR-2807 Ways and Means
(America Gives More Act of 2014) 113-HR-4619
Tom Reed (R-NY) 113-HR-4691
113-HR-3134
114-HR-1270 114-HR-4723 Ways and Means
(Restoring Access to Medication and Improving Health Savings Act) 114-HR-5445
Lynn Jenkins (R-KS)
114-HR-1675 114-HR-2356 Financial Services
(Capital Markets Improvement Act of 2016) 114-HR-686
Randy Hultgren (R-IL) 114-HR-1965
114-HR-2354
114-HR-1927 114-HR-526 Judiciary
(Fairness in Class Action Litigation and FACT Act)
Bob Goodlatte (R-VA)
114-HR-2262 114-HR-2263 Science, Space and Technology
(U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act) 114-HR-1508
Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) 114-HR-2261
114-HR-2357 114-HR-4850 Financial Services
(Accelerating Access to Capital Act of 2016) 114-HR-4852
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Continuation of Table C.1
Vehicle Bill Hitchhiker Bill(s) Reporting Committees
Ann Wagner (R-MO)
114-HR-3189 114-HR-2912 Financial Services
(Fed Oversight Reform and Modernization Act of 2015)
Bill Huizenga (R-MI)
114-HR-3716 114-HR-3821 Energy and Commerce
(Ensuring Access to Quality Medicaid Providers Act)
Larry Bucshon
114-HR-4361 114-HR-3023 Oversight and Government Reform
(Government Reform and Improvement Act of 2016) 114-HR-4921




114-HR-5711 114-HR-5715 Financial Services
(No U.S. Financing for Iran Act)
Bill Huizenga (R-MI)
114-HR-636 114-HR-629 Ways and Means
(FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016) 114-HR-630
Patrick Tiberi (R-OH)
114-HR-644 114-HR-641 Ways and Means
(Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015) 114-HR-640
Tom Reed (R-NY) 114-HR-637
114-HR-712 114-HR-1759 Judiciary
(Sunshine for Regulations and Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act) 114-HR-690 Oversight and Government Reform
Doug Collins (R-GA)
114-HR-8 114-HR-2358 Energy and Commerce




APPENDIX D: HYPOTHESIS TESTING ON DIFFERENT PARTISAN MAJORITIES, CH. 4
Table D.1: Testing Hypothesis 1 on Different Partisan Majorities
Dependent variable:
Floor Consideration
Dem. Majorities GOP Majorities Early GOP Majorities Later GOP Majorities
110th–111th 104th–109th & 112th–114th 104th–109th 112th–114th
Minority or Dissenting Views −1.308∗ −1.212∗ −1.122∗ −1.247∗
(0.204) (0.086) (0.114) (0.134)
Bipartisan Cosponsorship Coalition 0.379∗ −0.035 0.024 −0.046
(0.190) (0.089) (0.119) (0.136)
Majority Party Sponsor 0.050 0.154 0.296∗ −0.049
(0.260) (0.101) (0.130) (0.164)
Days Left in Congress (Scaled) 0.617∗ 0.487∗ 0.445∗ 0.549∗
(0.091) (0.037) (0.048) (0.060)
Commemorative Bill 2.293∗ 0.311 0.540∗ −0.097
(1.029) (0.217) (0.272) (0.374)
Constant 1.709∗ 1.365∗ 1.229∗ 1.389∗
(0.314) (0.193) (0.230) (0.243)
Congress-Level Fixed Effects Yes No No No
Congress-Level Random Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Committee-Level Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,051 4,633 2,924 1,709
Log Likelihood −439.293 −2,478.653 −1,503.119 −961.052
∗p<0.05
Note: The columns of this table present coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. The GOP Majorities, Early GOP Majorities,
and Later GOP Majorities models all include varying intercepts estimated at the committee and Congress level. The Dem. Majorities
model includes a dummy variable for the 111th Congress and varying intercepts estimated at the committee level. The coefficient on that
dummy variable has been suppressed. Standard errors are listed below the coefficients in parentheses. The unit of analysis for all models
is a bill.
Table D.2: Testing Hypothesis 2 on Different Partisan Majorities
Dependent variable:
Floor Consideration
Dem. Majorities GOP Majorities Early GOP Majorities Later GOP Majorities
110th–111th 104th–109th & 112th–114th 104th–109th 112th–114th
Minority or Dissenting Views −1.252∗ −1.481∗ −1.366∗ −1.488∗
(0.255) (0.103) (0.137) (0.157)
Cmte. Ideological Distance 5.438 0.943 −4.219 4.793
(5.237) (1.709) (2.525) (3.587)
Bipartisan Cosponsorship Coalition 0.296 −0.008 0.118 −0.110
(0.237) (0.107) (0.143) (0.163)
Majority Party Sponsor −0.175 0.183 0.419∗ −0.178
(0.326) (0.115) (0.144) (0.192)
Days Left in Congress (Scaled) 0.639∗ 0.490∗ 0.478∗ 0.514∗
(0.111) (0.044) (0.058) (0.070)
Commemorative Bill 1.865 0.171 0.393 −0.200
(1.041) (0.235) (0.293) (0.399)
Constant 2.063∗ 1.611∗ 1.474∗ 1.550∗
(0.437) (0.244) (0.285) (0.360)
Congress-Level Fixed Effects Yes No No No
Congress-Level Random Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Committee-Level Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 851 3,707 2,375 1,332
Log Likelihood −313.430 −1,831.676 −1,112.973 −706.336
∗p<0.05
Note: The columns of this table present coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. The GOP Majorities, Early GOP Majorities,
and Later GOP Majorities models all include varying intercepts estimated at the committee and Congress level. The Dem. Majorities
model includes a dummy variable for the 111th Congress and varying intercepts estimated at the committee level. The coefficient on that
dummy variable has been suppressed. Standard errors are listed below the coefficients in parentheses. The unit of analysis for all models
is a bill. Due to the inclusion of a committee-level covariate, these models are fit on a subset of the data that only includes singly-referred
bills. The variable labeled “Cmte. Ideological Distance” (for the purposes of space) is the same variable that is called Abs. Dist. (Cmte.
Maj. Median - Floor Maj. Median) above.
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Table D.3: Testing Hypothesis 2a on Different Partisan Majorities
Dependent variable:
Floor Consideration
Dem. Majorities GOP Majorities Early GOP Majorities Later GOP Majorities
110th–111th 104th–109th & 112th–114th 104th–109th 112th–114th
Minority or Dissenting Views −1.524∗ −1.329∗ −1.166∗ −1.868∗
(0.275) (0.177) (0.231) (0.314)
Cmte. Ideological Distance (Scaled) 0.331∗
(0.196)
Minority or Dissenting Views X −1.089∗
Cmte. Ideological Distance (Scaled) (0.415)
Cmte. Ideological Distance 2.075 −2.584 2.698
(2.024) (2.970) (3.921)
Minority or Dissenting Views X −2.894 −4.543 5.847
Cmte. Ideological Distance (2.768) (4.245) (4.135)
Bipartisan Cosponsorship Coalition 0.298 −0.010 0.110 −0.111
(0.237) (0.107) (0.144) (0.163)
Majority Party Sponsor −0.200 0.187 0.423∗ −0.177
(0.326) (0.115) (0.144) (0.192)
Days Left in Congress (Scaled) 0.633∗ 0.490∗ 0.478∗ 0.514∗
(0.112) (0.044) (0.058) (0.070)
Commemorative Bill 1.805∗ 0.175 0.391 −0.224
(1.040) (0.235) (0.293) (0.401)
Constant 2.239∗ 1.553∗ 1.403∗ 1.679∗
(0.398) (0.249) (0.291) (0.377)
Congress-Level Fixed Effects Yes No No No
Congress-Level Random Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Committee-Level Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 851 3,707 2,375 1,332
Log Likelihood −310.053 −1,831.130 −1,112.404 −705.330
∗p<0.05
Note: The columns of this table present coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. The GOP Majorities, Early GOP Majorities,
and Later GOP Majorities models all include varying intercepts estimated at the committee and Congress level. The Dem. Majorities
model includes a dummy variable for the 111th Congress and varying intercepts estimated at the committee level. The coefficient on that
dummy variable has been suppressed. Standard errors are listed below the coefficients in parentheses. The unit of analysis for all models
is a bill. Due to the inclusion of a committee-level covariate, these models are fit on a subset of the data that only includes singly-referred
bills. The variable labeled “Cmte. Ideological Distance” (for the purposes of space) is the same variable that is called Abs. Dist. (Cmte.
Maj. Median - Floor Maj. Median) above.
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Table D.4: Testing Hypothesis 3 on Different Partisan Majorities
Dependent variable:
floor
Dem. Majorities GOP Majorities Early GOP Majorities Later GOP Majorities
110th–111th 104th–109th & 112th–114th 104th–109th 112th–114th
Minority or Dissenting Views −1.291∗ −1.222∗ −1.131∗ −1.246∗
(0.207) (0.086) (0.114) (0.133)
Sponsor Ideological Distance 0.552 −0.404 −1.246∗ 0.965
(0.944) (0.365) (0.449) (0.678)
Bipartisan Cosponsorship Coalition 0.393∗ −0.038 0.013 −0.033
(0.193) (0.090) (0.121) (0.138)
Majority Party Sponsor 0.396 −0.145 −0.462 0.526
(0.659) (0.270) (0.318) (0.528)
Days Left in Congress (Scaled) 0.610∗ 0.490∗ 0.444∗ 0.559∗
(0.092) (0.038) (0.049) (0.061)
Commemorative Bill 2.281∗ 0.321 0.623∗ −0.193
(1.030) (0.219) (0.279) (0.376)
Constant 1.273 1.724∗ 2.149∗ 0.707
(0.783) (0.356) (0.420) (0.637)
Congress-Level Fixed Effects Yes No No No
Congress-Level Random Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Committee-Level Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,019 4,563 2,885 1,678
Log Likelihood −427.904 −2,435.934 −1,478.501 −937.411
∗p<0.05
Note: The columns of this table present coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. The GOP Majorities, Early GOP Majorities,
and Later GOP Majorities models all include varying intercepts estimated at the committee and Congress level. The Dem. Majorities
model includes a dummy variable for the 111th Congress and varying intercepts estimated at the committee level. The coefficient on
that dummy variable has been suppressed. Standard errors are listed below the coefficients in parentheses. The unit of analysis for all
models is a bill. The variable labeled “Sponsor Ideological Distance” (for the purposes of space) is the same variable that is called Abs.
Dist. (Sponsor - Floor Maj. Median) above.
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Table D.5: Testing Hypothesis 3a on Different Partisan Majorities
Dependent variable:
floor
Dem. Majorities GOP Majorities Early GOP Majorities Later GOP Majorities
110th–111th 104th–109th & 112th–114th 104th–109th 112th–114th
Minority or Dissenting Views −1.126∗ −1.057∗ −0.892∗ −1.195∗
(0.281) (0.114) (0.151) (0.179)
Sponsor Ideological Distance 0.731 −0.102 −0.862 1.091
(0.975) (0.390) (0.477) (0.742)
Minority or Dissenting Views X −1.306 −1.223∗ −1.712∗ −0.388
Sponsor Ideological Distance (1.281) (0.555) (0.721) (0.924)
Bipartisan Cosponsorship Coalition 0.405∗ −0.028 0.023 −0.029
(0.192) (0.090) (0.121) (0.138)
Majority Party Sponsor1 0.443 0.019 −0.278 0.607
(0.667) (0.280) (0.327) (0.563)
Days Left in Congress (Scaled) 0.620∗ 0.489∗ 0.445∗ 0.558∗
(0.092) (0.038) (0.049) (0.061)
Commemorative Bill 2.234∗ 0.311 0.598∗ −0.195
(1.031) (0.219) (0.278) (0.376)
Constant 1.109 1.505∗ 1.899∗ 0.604
(0.795) (0.369) (0.431) (0.683)
Congress-Level Fixed Effects Yes No No No
Congress-Level Random Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Committee-Level Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,019 4,563 2,885 1,678
Log Likelihood −428.029 −2,433.422 −1,475.489 −937.322
∗p<0.05
Note: The columns of this table present coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. The GOP Majorities, Early GOP Majorities,
and Later GOP Majorities models all include varying intercepts estimated at the committee and Congress level. The Dem. Majorities
model includes a dummy variable for the 111th Congress and varying intercepts estimated at the committee level. The coefficient on
that dummy variable has been suppressed. Standard errors are listed below the coefficients in parentheses. The unit of analysis for all
models is a bill. The variable labeled “Sponsor Ideological Distance” (for the purposes of space) is the same variable that is called Abs.
Dist. (Sponsor - Floor Maj. Median) above.
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